Why Is Xi Jinping Purging So Many People?

In a new essay for Foreign Affairs, my Center for China Analysis colleague Shengyu Wang and I argue that Xi Jinping’s intensifying anti-corruption campaign is not just a power grab, but part of a much larger “self-revolution” agenda aimed at making the Chinese Communist Party more disciplined, effective, and durable. We analyze the campaign’s evolution, explore Xi’s obsession with a conversation Mao had in a cave in 1945, explain why he does not see China’s first emperor Qin Shi Huang as a model for his rule, evaluate whether self-revolution is working or not, and ponder whether Xi can turn authoritarian resilience into authoritarian permanence.

Here’s an excerpt from the introduction:

“The standard explanation for these purges is that Xi, China’s most powerful ruler in generations, seeks to sideline rivals and consolidate power. There is much truth in that. The takedown of crooked senior leaders tied to his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao helped Xi win public support and centralize decision-making, eventually setting him up to rule for life. From this perspective, he now keeps purging because he has made so many enemies within the party that he must continue striking to stay secure …

But that explanation is not enough … Indeed, focusing only on dramatic top-level purges risks missing the larger story. What began as an anticorruption push has evolved into an extensive apparatus for managing cadres, enforcing political priorities, and supervising policy implementation. Xi’s discipline campaign should thus be understood as a sweeping effort to transform the CCP itself.

While Mao told the party to make revolution, Xi, the princeling son of a revolutionary hero, is now guiding what he calls the party’s ‘self-revolution.’ He is using discipline not only as an instrument of control but also as a theory of governance: internal rules define priorities and acceptable conduct, ideological education produces more dedicated officials, inspections improve compliance, and high-level purges deter wrongdoing. If self-revolution succeeds, and it well might, it could make the CCP a more effective and durable institution—one capable of ruling China indefinitely irrespective of who is at the helm. In that sense, self-revolution is Xi’s effort to render China’s succession concerns moot.”

Read the full essay: Xi’s Forever Purge