Nothing new in the peace operations review

It was originally expected in January. Then we were told to expect it by the end of June. But it wasn't until yesterday that the long-awaited report of the Secretary-General on the future of all forms of United Nations peace operations finally saw the light of day. A more detailed analysis will have to wait for another time, but I’ve pulled together a some immediate reactions after a first read of the report.

I was not far from the mark when I predicted, over a year ago, that the report would rehash the following talking points:

that (1) UN peace operations have a track record of implementing a wide range of mandated tasks; (2) they remain a flexible tool that can be deployed in response to many different political, peace, and security requirements; (3) their effectiveness is primarily hindered by an adverse geopolitical environment and the absence of unified political support; and (4) the existing structures and approaches underpinning UN peace operations remain largely up to the task, though under-resourced.

There is very little in this report that we had not previously heard from the Secretariat, whether in A New Agenda for Peace or from UN80. The report summarizes the changes to the political and operational environment, highlighting the increase in conflicts, the changing nature of conflict, and declining commitment to international law, but it doesn’t acknowledge deficiencies in how missions are designed and how mandates are implemented. Instead of articulating a new vision for peace operations that responds to the changing context and addresses shortcomings, the report effectively calls for the maintenance of existing arrangements and approaches.

The report points out that

[the Security Council] often struggles to provide consistent and unified support for operations… This, along with a mismatch between complex mandates and resources in several operations, makes it hard for peace operations to respond effectively to evolving and increasingly complex realities. (para. 8)

This is true, and the report castigates member states who fail to do their part, including deadbeat financial contributors, troop contributors who maintain caveats, and obstructionist host governments. But it is conspicuously silent on shortcomings within the Secretariat, and implies that responsibility for action on international peace and security rests almost entirely with member states. On peacemaking, it states

the United Nations commits to a systematic offer of its good offices to help the parties to intra- or inter-State conflicts resolve their conflicts through peaceful means. Member States are encouraged to use this offer. (para. 29(a)).

On fact-finding, it states

The Security Council should…engage more regularly in fact-finding in cases of disputes that may represent a threat to international peace and security. (para. 29(c))

But the Secretary-General is not a powerless bureaucrat who needs to be invited before using his good offices or dispatching a fact-finding mission to generate options for UN engagement. Secretaries-General such as Hammarskjöld, Thant, and Perez de Cuellar who proactively used the tools at their disposal were effective even in times of heightened geopolitical contestation. The next Secretary-General must follow in their footsteps, and recognize that the unforeseen and extraordinary expenses mechanism in the regular budget exists facilitate these types of activities.

It is also the role of the Secretary-General to generate proposals for member states, rather than to pontificate on problems. For example, the report recommends that the Fifth Committee review reimbursement frameworks “to ensure they are fit for a wide variety of modes and configurations, while incentivizing performance and the development of critical enablers” (para. 66(h)). If so, why didn’t the Secretary-General submit proposals when the Fifth Committee reviewed both the contingent-owned equipment and personnel reimbursement frameworks earlier this year?

Despite the changed context, many of the recommendations from the 2015 report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) remain relevant—and unimplemented. One of the four key shifts called for by the Panel was a move towards a tailored, flexible approach drawing upon the full spectrum of peace operations. The report makes a show of acknowledging this particular HIPPO recommendation (paras. 16-19), but fundamentally misrepresents it by presenting the full spectrum as a choice between three options: special political missions, peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement operations.

The HIPPO argued that

Terms such as “special political missions” and “peacekeeping operations” are ingrained in mindsets and the bureaucracy of the United Nations [and] constrain the Organization’s ability to respond more flexibly to the needs on the ground.

As such,

The sharp distinctions between peacekeeping operations and special political missions should give way to a continuum of responses and smoother transitions between different phases of missions.

The manner the full spectrum is framed in the Secretary-General’s report not only subverts the original concept, but it reinforces the very problem the HIPPO was drawing attention to.

At the heart of the problem is the persistence of the lead department approach in which the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) is the lead department for all special political missions and the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) is the lead department for all peacekeeping operations. The consolidation of formerly separate DPPA and DPO thematic units in the single Peacebuilding and Peace Support Office earlier this year further weakened the case for maintaining counterproductive distinctions between different types of missions. Even so, the two departments—who led the review—have an interest in perpetuating the bifurcation of peace operations in order to preserve their own petty fiefdoms.

One practical way forward is what the Secretary-General calls networked multidimensional operations (paras. 36-40), in which programmatic tasks in a mission mandate and the associated resources would be delegated to partners best placed to implement them. This is not a new proposal; a version was proposed in 2012 by the Senior Advisory Group on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict. But the report does not present a roadmap for taking this approach forward. It also limits this arrangement to partners within the UN system. At a time when application of Security Council resolution 2719 seems an ever more distant prospect, networked approaches may provide a way to operationalize meaningful partnerships with regional organizations and other partners on the basis of comparative advantage.

Something conspicuously absent from the report is a reference to the declining commitment to the tenets of liberal peace—democracy, human rights, and the rule of law—and the increasing allure of authoritarianism. Earlier this year, Freedom House reported that global freedom declined for the 20th consecutive year in 2025.1 Moreover, the Regimes of the World dataset not only shows a decline in the number of democracies (especially liberal democracies), but also an increase in the number of autocracies (especially closed autocracies) over the past decade.2

These trends matter because the key member state stakeholders—members of the Security Council, host governments, and troop- and police-contributing countries—can no longer be counted upon to champion the peacemaking and peacebuilding activities at the heart of UN peace operations. As I noted earlier this month, an increasing number of member states subscribe to an authoritarian vision of conflict management that rejects mediation and constraints on the use of force, relying instead on repression and instruments of state coercion.3

The report explicitly privileges the interests of host states over those of other parties to the conflict. This is particularly problematic given the growing evidence that UN peacekeeping operations have inadvertently bolstered host state authorities in ways that enable authoritarian behavior.4 The report states that the views and priorities of the host state should be consistently sought, while the perspectives of other parties should only be considered, where relevant (para. 31 (a)). Moreover, it calls for the establishment of a compact on mutual commitments between the Council, the Secretariat, and the host state; this would affirm host state consent with “the mission’s strategic purpose, key uniformed capabilities, equipment and technological enablers” (para. 31(b)). But this fundamentally misunderstands the interests of host states and provides them with further leverage for instrumentalizing missions into tools of regime preservation.5 A compact cannot guarantee the host state consent, but it can be instrumentalized by a host state to obstruct mandate implementation.

The various enforcement operations that have been authorized by the Security Council over the past two decades have generally been deployed in support of host state authorities against their opponents. Although the report emphasizes the importance of political solutions (para. 23(a) and (c)), it fails to grapple with the fact that peace enforcement—including when disguised as stabilization—undermines peacemaking efforts by reducing incentives for political solutions.6 It isn’t enough that the report calls for enforcement action to be accompanied by inclusive political strategies (para. 66(e)). When the UN has been relegated to a supporting role as a service provider to a non-UN force, UN is no longer control of the strategy and no longer enjoys the impartiality required to credibly support a political solution.

The report highlights the importance of ensuring the security of peacekeepers and, to this end, underlines the importance of capacity building and access to new technologies. It also calls for member states to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against peacekeepers (para. 59(d)) and respect the privileges and immunities of peace operations and their personnel (para. 59(e)). This ignores the fundamental problem. When peacekeepers are deployed to support the extension of host state authority, build the capacity of host state security forces, and use force against opposition armed groups, they are effectively a party to the conflict. This may mean that they no longer enjoy protections under international law and are seen as legitimate targets.7

There are several elements I was hoping to see in the report that are missing altogether. One is an acknowledgement that, when the Security Council is gridlocked, the General Assembly provides a venue through which member states can pursue collective security, including the mandating of peace operations.

Another is the fact that special political missions remain hamstrung by arbitrary limitations on how they can be backstopped and what resources are available to support their start-up and transition. Eliminating these restrictions would also help overcome longstanding obstacles utilizing the full spectrum of peace operations.

The review should also have been an opportunity to engage in a long overdue reflection on the application of the basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping, namely impartiality, consent of the parties, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. The report should have acknowledged that the expedient approach taken to follow these principles over the past two decades have distorted them beyond recognition. The effective abandonment of these principles in the context of peace enforcement and stabilization has not only undermined the effectiveness of UN peace operations to implement their mandates, but has also undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the UN in peacemaking. Furthermore, in line with a full spectrum approach, these principles shouldn’t be seen as only being applicable in peacekeeping operations, but should guide all UN peace operations.

When the General Assembly requested this review in September 2024, it wanted the Secretary-General to provide recommendations on how to adapt the UN toolbox “to meet evolving needs, to allow for more agile, tailored responses to existing, emerging and future challenges”.8 This is not what was delivered. The fact that the report contains no follow-up mechanism only serves to drive home the point that this is not a call for change. This should come as little surprise. After all, the report arrives less than six months before the end of the term of a Secretary-General who has shown a remarkable lack of interest in the peace and security work of the Organization.

The report was drafted internally by DPPA and DPO, and it shows. The objective of the two departments—effective maintenance of the internal status quo—was a foregone conclusion once they were assigned by the Secretary-General to lead the review, and the report is careful to avoid critique of either department or make recommendations that would threaten their bureaucratic interests, such as their influence and level of resources. There are also revisionist elements intended to pursue departmental objectives to the detriment of the enterprise, including in how the full spectrum of peace operations is framed and in stating that peace operations are accountable to the lead departments (para. 55 (b)), when in fact their accountability is to the Secretary-General under the delegation of authority framework.9

The Secretary-General’s report therefore represents a massive missed opportunity, but it’s not too late for member states to salvage the overall review process. Ultimately, it is in the interest of all member states for the UN peace and security toolkit to be available to prevent, diffuse, and resolve conflict, and this review can still help realign and reposition UN peace operations accordingly.

The release of the Secretary-General’s report should not be seen as the conclusion of the review, but as the start of a next phase. As a companion piece to the report, member states should commission a meaningfully independent review, undertaken by experts who do not have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, examining successes and failures in peace operations and drawing upon the wealth of quantitative and qualitative research that has been undertaken in recent decades on peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping. Member states should also press the next Secretary-General to clearly articulate a new vision for the UN in peace and security along with the necessary changes in structure and approach. And, crucially, member states should empower the next Secretary-General to achieve that vision.

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© 2026 Eugene Chen under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations University.