Leadership at the UN in a time of monsters

This past week in Davos, Western leaders finally acknowledged that the assumptions that underpinned global order during the unipolar moment no longer hold true, and the familiar processes and procedures built on those foundations no longer suffice.

With the 2026 programme budget, we saw how the Secretariat and member states tried to respond to new realities using old approaches, ending up with an outcome that only serves to undermine the capacity of the UN to deliver. New approaches are needed. Turmoil and heightened geopolitical contestation can serve as catalysts at the UN for creativity and innovation in multilateral responses, as was demonstrated during the Cold War. But in the absence of leadership from the Secretary-General, meeting the moment requires member states to resist the temptation to fall back on familiar working methods and have the courage to think—and act—outside the box.

Last week, I wrote about the outcome of the Fifth Committee negotiations on the 2026 programme budget. Member States achieved consensus on a complicated budget proposal despite having only a month to consider it. Under normal circumstances, this would have been commendable, reflecting the ability of Member States to reach agreement despite significant differences in opinion.

But we are not in normal circumstances.

The outcome was objectively bad for the UN. The significant budget cuts approved by the General Assembly mean that the Secretariat is expected to do more with significantly less.1 That is even before factoring the already crippling liquidity challenges, which are exacerbated by the cuts. We got here because the Secretariat and member states reflexively fell back on their usual approaches to budget negotiations despite the extraordinary circumstances caused by the refusal of the United States to pay its assessed contributions to the regular budget.

The Secretary-General approached the initial moves by the Trump administration to pause foreign aid2 and review U.S. participation in international organizations3 as if they were a hardball variation of the criticism and obstructionism expected from any Republican administration.4 The launch of the UN80 initiative in March 2025 can be understood as an attempt to get the United States to pay its contributions for 2025 by signaling openness to reform and cost cutting.

The Secretary-General doubled down on this approach by announcing in May that he would make major cuts to the 2026 budget request he already submitted to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). This gamble clearly did not pay off, as the administration subsequently requested the cancellation of funds already appropriated by Congress for the payment of UN contributions. But the Secretary-General had already publicly committed to issuing revised estimates reflecting “meaningful reductions in the overall budget level”.5

Member States had serious substantive and procedural concerns about the revised estimates. Many were fully aware of the detrimental effects the budget cuts would have on both programme delivery and liquidity, but they agreed to them anyway. Why?

First, Member States have in recent decades been content to let the Secretary-General drive the agenda at the UN. They have become more comfortable with reacting to policy initiatives from the Secretary-General than with coming up with bold, ambitious ideas of their own. This tendency is primarily driven by the information asymmetry and capacity imbalance between the Secretariat and Member States, is reinforced through intergovernmental working methods, and has worsened since the COVID-19 pandemic.6

Second, Member States are deeply divided. And those that are part of larger negotiating blocs, such as the European Union or the Group of 77 and China, often find their room for manoeuvre further constrained by the need to negotiate on the basis of a common position. This not only makes it difficult for them to introduce new elements into a debate, but also makes responding to new developments challenging given the need to first consult and develop a consensus response.7

Together, these factors result in the Fifth Committee increasingly defaulting either to the recommendations of the ACABQ, particularly on time-bound budget proposals, or deferring or takes no action on other administrative questions. But they also apply to intergovernmental processes beyond the Fifth Committee.

Certain member states who see themselves as good multilateralists often want to be seen as supporting the Secretary-General. What they fail to appreciate, however, is that the Secretariat is not a monolith.8 When member states reflexively support proposals presented in the name of the Secretary-General, they risk becoming unwitting conscripts in interdepartmental turf wars.

Particularly when leadership and vision from the Secretary-General is lacking, each of the constituent entities of the Secretariat pursues its own interests and priorities, and the proposals presented by the Secretariat are the result of internal bargaining and compromises amongst departments and offices.9 Recommendations to member states are driven as much by the bureaucratic interests of the department that drafted the report as they are by the actual problem to be solved. Budget cuts only serve to heighten the self-preservation instincts of Secretariat entities, which translate into suppression of internal criticism and avoiding public admission of shortcomings.10

These effects were evident in the fragmented nature of the UN80 revised estimates proposal. They are also reflected in other policy processes such as the Secretariat review on the future of UN peace operations, the results of which are expected to be issued soon to the General Assembly and Security Council.

Member States need to shift away from a reactive posture to a proactive one in the General Assembly. Member states need not limit themselves to considering an issue on the basis of analysis and proposals presented by the Secretary-General. They can submit their own reform proposals or policy initiatives to the General Assembly or establish external panels to generate independent recommendations.11 Middle powers who are not part of larger UN voting blocs—such as Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—are uniquely positioned to play roles as thought leaders and policy entrepreneurs.

A more proactive stance on the part of the broader membership also includes shifting more decision-making on peace and security issues to the General Assembly. Member states should not forget that the General Assembly was a venue for considerable decision and innovation when the Security Council was deadlocked during the Cold War. The first armed peacekeeping mission, the first interim administration mission, and the first joint mission with a regional organization were all General Assembly-mandated peace operations.12 The General Assembly can draw on its ability to dispatch fact-finding missions13, and can also potentially act on recommendations from the Peacebuilding Commission.

The ACABQ has always played an under-appreciated role in the functioning of the Secretariat, but its influence has only grown in recent years given how frequently the Fifth Committee rubber stamps its recommendations. But the ACABQ today largely consists of former Fifth Committee delegates. Instead, member states should appoint to the ACABQ actual “financial experts of recognized standing”14 and other individuals who can provide authoritative and actionable analysis on administrative and budgetary questions. This will require a rethink of how candidates are nominated and how they are considered, both within regional groups and in the Fifth Committee.

These measures run counter to decades of habit, but in the current liminal period of geopolitical upheaval, the assumptions and practices of the post-Cold War era no longer hold. 2026 will be a pivotal year for the continued existence and relevance of the UN. Instead of waiting for vision and leadership to materialize, member states should find the courage to step up. Only through proactive efforts can the UN be repositioned and reconfigured to realize its potential as a platform for finding and implementing multilateral solutions to the global challenges that face humanity today.

Share

© 2026 Eugene Chen under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations University.