Ethics, Hermeneutics, Historiography
Continuing with Boulnois s history of free will, the next exploration concerns the way that Epictetus uses the originally Aristotelian phrase what depends on us . Here again Boulnois weaves in much discussion of the broader Stoic school. The Stoics were forced, we say, to reconcile determinism with the freedom of assent . But in the Stoic school, Continue reading Epictetus: What Depends on Us
The next stage of development in Boulnois s historical argument about free will focuses on the late Stoic Epictetus (d. 135 CE). An accurate account of Epictetus requires that we understand the views of the Stoic school as Epictetus received them. This affords an excellent occasion to give these views a more than passing mention. (In Continue reading Epictetus In Context
Boulnois sums up the results of the investigation into Aristotelian ethical proairesis (resolution, or choice ) and the ambiguities of freedom as follows. Is it necessary to say that this resolution is free? Does it include a choice? The concept of choice assumes the existence of an alternative, followed by the pursuit of one of its Continue reading Resolution and Freedom
Resolution is an act of the agent. Is it a form of opinion or of desire? At the outset, is resolution an opinion or a belief (doxa), for example the opinion that this is to be done ? No, for three reasons. 1. Opinions are vaster objects: we have opinions about eternal truths and about impossible Continue reading Resolution Distinguished
Resolution is Olivier Boulnois s recommended translation for what I have still been calling the choice associated with deliberation in Aristotle s ethics. I am slowly pulling together resources for a larger project that aims to recover a positive view of the core of classical and especially Aristotelian ethics, and in particular to show that Continue reading Ethical Resolution
I don t like arguing in terms that are primarily negative, but found myself doing just that in the course of recent work on Schneewind s The Invention of Autonomy. There, a debate between voluntarism and anti-voluntarism occupies center stage. Unsurprisingly, I found myself identifying with the anti-voluntarists. But as I said, I don t like arguing in Continue reading Classical Ethics
After all the troubled waters of late with voluntarism and free will, it s time for a breath of fresh air. In an upcoming post, I ll be taking a more detailed look at the chapter Resolution in Olivier Boulnois s Généalogie de la liberté (2021), which does a brilliant job of uncovering what I think is a Continue reading Resolution Revisited
There is a great deal more of interest in J. B. Schneewind s The Invention of Autonomy beyond what I have covered. His treatment of the 18th century is as rich as what we have seen from the seventeenth. Nonetheless, the main contours of his argument have already been well enough documented to show the basis Continue reading Kant s Anti-Voluntarism
Schneewind dedicates the final section of his chapter on the Cambridge Platonists to their views on the vexed topic of free will. There are quite a few interesting nuances here. But it is important to first recall a few generalities, beyond what Schneewind mentions. The following thumbnail sketch is far from complete, but will serve Continue reading Free Will in the Cambridge Platonists
Viewed historically, none of the world s major religious traditions is a monolith. The Cambridge Platonists were not so much philosophers as Christians who sought new ways to avoid the destructive sectarianism that became especially common in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. They stand out as sincerely religious figures for whom religion ought to put ethics first, Continue reading The…