Commanding with Courage

With the recent release of the the Duty to Disobey documentary, I wanted to share some of my thoughts on the military’s covid shot mandate, particularly as it pertained to those in command positions at the time.1

The last few years have been highly revelatory for those paying attention. Since 2020, observant Americans have learned much about how the federal government operates. Concerned individuals have witnessed oppressive policies wielded under the guise of “covid response.” Abuses of power that many Americans would have previously considered unfathomable here in the “land of the free” became routine actions. If there is an overarching lesson that concerned citizens should take from this recent period in history, it is that our freedoms are not nearly as secure as perhaps many assumed them to be. Constant vigilance by an ever-watchful public is required to safeguard our liberties from continued government encroachment.

This is particularly important when we consider the role of the institution that many regard as our primary guardian of liberty: the U.S. Armed Forces.

Despite the prominence the Department of Defense (DoD) has long held in the minds and hearts of many Americans, it became one of the foremost objects of criticism due to its own covid response measures.2 The military became a particularly egregious enforcer of tyrannical policies. The most notable of these policies was the mandate for all service members to receive the covid shots.

The Unlawful Mandate

The covid shot mandate, which went into effect on August 24, 2021, was not only unwarranted but also unlawful. In fact, shortly after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) licensed Pfizer’s Comirnaty product, Children’s Health Defense (CHD) filed a lawsuit for the “allegedly deceptive, rushed licensure of Pfizer’s Comirnaty vaccine.”3

CHD characterized the FDA’s actions as “a classic ‘bait and switch,’ allowing Pfizer, the Biden administration, the U.S. military and employers to exhort people to take ‘licensed’ vaccines when in fact the vaccines available and being administered continued to be the Pfizer-BioNTech Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) vaccines.”4 This is significant because Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s covid injection mandate required fully licensed products: “Mandatory vaccination against COVID-19 will only use COVID-19 vaccines that receive full licensure from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in accordance with FDA-approved labeling and guidance.”5 Notably, DoD’s mandate went into effect just one day after the FDA licensed the Comirnaty product.6

Let us attempt to make sense of this series of facts and their implications. On August 23, 2021, the FDA licensed the Comirnaty product. The next day, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin implemented the covid shot mandate which required a fully licensed product. This is where the earlier mentioned “bait and switch” comes into play.7 On the day the mandate went into effect, Kennedy and Nass of CHD pointed out “several bizarre aspects to the FDA approval” to include the comparative stocks of the fully licensed Comirnaty and Pfizer-BioNTech EUA products as well as the FDA’s claims of interchangeability of the two products while also explicitly maintaining that there is a clear legal distinction between the two.8 This designation of interchangeability is unfounded because the interchangeability requirements detailed in 42. U.S.C. §262 were never met.9 Additionally, the FDA’s own biologics database lists no products as “biosimilar” or “interchangeable” with Comirnaty.10

Kennedy and Nass draw attention to the legal issues this creates: “There is a huge real-world difference between products approved under EUA compared with those the FDA has fully licensed. EUA products are experimental under U.S. law. Both the Nuremberg Code and federal regulations provide that no one can force a human being to participate in this experiment.”11 Kennedy and Nass go on to conclude that the FDA’s actions seem to support the conclusion that the intent behind this scheme is to permit continued use of the Pfizer-BioNTech EUA product, for which there is a liability shield, in place of the now-licensed Comirnaty product, for which there is no liability shield.12 As Kennedy and Nass note, “EUA-approved COVID vaccines have an extraordinary liability shield under the 2005 Public Readiness and Preparedness Act” which has granted that “[v]accine manufacturers, distributors, providers and government planners are immune from liability.”13

Though referring specifically to possible school mandates, Kennedy and Nass make the following point which also applies to the military mandate: “Americans, told that the Pfizer COVID vaccine is now licensed, will understandably assume COVID vaccine mandates are lawful. But only EUA-authorized vaccines, for which no one has any real liability, will be available during the next few weeks when many school mandate deadlines occur.”14 They go on to state that “[t]he FDA appears to be purposefully tricking American citizens into giving up their right to refuse an experimental product.”15

DoD directly supported the FDA’s deceptive practices. On September 14, 2021, DoD published a memorandum relying on the FDA’s claim of interchangeability between the two products, stating that “DoD health care providers will use both the Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 vaccine and the Comirnaty COVID-19 vaccine interchangeably for the purpose of vaccinating Service members in accordance with the Secretary of Defense [mandate].”16 As mentioned above, the claims of interchangeability are baseless. In essence, this meant that DoD effectively mandated EUA products, a violation of 21 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) §360bbb-3(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III), which requires that potential recipients be informed of “the option to accept or refuse administration of the product.”17

This prohibition against mandating experimental products, absent a presidential waiver, was upheld in Doe v. Rumsfeld (2003), which declared the DoD’s anthrax program to be illegal.18 There exists a statute in federal law specific to the military, 10 U.S.C. §1107a, that allows for a presidential waiver of the requirement to provide informed consent, including informing the potential recipient of the right to refuse.19 No presidential waiver of this type was ever invoked during the period in which the mandate was in effect.

Additionally, DoD’s mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), found in 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1, which only permits limitations on religious freedoms when there is “compelling governmental interest,” and the limitations of these freedoms must be carried out via the “least restrictive means.”20 An overwhelming percentage of requests for religious accommodations, such as exemptions on grounds of religious objections, were denied without due consideration, an issue highlighted in U.S. Navy SEALs 1-26 v. Biden.21

The grand irony is that the unlawful implementation and enforcement of these policies were far more destructive to the military’s readiness posture than the purported health threats they were ostensibly implemented to mitigate.

This wholesale departure by our military from both the law and common sense leaves us with some serious questions. What are the lingering impacts of these policies on the military? How did this happen in the first place? Why did military leaders get this so wrong at all levels? Why did virtually all of them go along with such flagrantly abusive and illegal conduct?

I will address a few of those points by keying in on one factor that is critically important for all military endeavors: the role of the commander.

What we witnessed across the military during the covid response period was only possible because of large scale abandonment by military commanders of their command-specific duties and responsibilities. I would like to share my perspective, informed by my own nineteen years of service as an Army officer, culminating in service as the commander of a battalion at the time the covid shot mandate went into effect. I have written about this topic before but want to share some of these ideas here because their importance is so often underappreciated.22

Many people may not yet realize the full extent of the damage the covid response policies have had on our military. Additionally, many Americans might be surprised to know the lasting effects suffered by these policies continue to be largely ignored by current senior Department officials. Though DoD now admits the mandate was “unlawful as implemented,” there has been no accountability to date for the Department-wide legal violations.23 Only very minor adjustments have been made to rectify the corresponding injustices.24

Another point for consideration is understanding why this remains so important though several years have passed since the mandate was implemented. Even Americans that have not served in uniform or may not have close ties to the military should pay attention to what happens within the armed forces. Institutional policies that first appear in the military can often serve as indicators of what may be later implemented more broadly across society. Policies that would typically encounter heavy resistance among the public can first gain traction through ordered compliance in the military and then subsequently be introduced to other segments of the population.

The Proper Role of Orders

The nature of the military is unique. Its purpose and operational demands require the highest standards of order and discipline. As we might imagine, all military activities are performed with a purpose, whether it’s training, planning operations, or conducting equipment maintenance. Accomplishing these actions effectively and to standard requires strict task assignment, management, and compliance. It should come as no surprise that the military is an “orders-based” institution. In other words, tasks associated with everything from routine actions to complex operations are managed through the issuance of orders.

Orders, in and of themselves, are not a problem and constitute an essential component of achieving high levels of readiness. Prompt and dutiful compliance with issued orders is central to unit discipline and a key factor in operational success. For example, let us consult Army Regulation (AR) 600-20 Army Command Policy, which has this to say about discipline: “Commanders and other leaders will maintain discipline according to … applicable laws and regulations, and the orders of seniors.”25 Commanders require compliance from their subordinates just as they comply with the orders given by their superiors, often higher commanders.

Service members must comply with orders, even if they disagree with those orders or believe them to be unsound. Conditions permitting, an individual may have an opportunity to discuss potential reservations about an order with the issuing authority, typically a higher commander. These discussions could result in some amendment to the original order. However, these reservations in no way justify non-compliance with the given order, and if the order stands as initially given, it must be obeyed.

There is one important qualifier, however, with respect to orders compliance: orders must be legal. The Army makes this point clear in AR 600-20 when explaining the importance of compliance: “All personnel in the Army are required to strictly obey and promptly execute the legal orders of their lawful seniors” (emphasis added).26

The other services demand the same strict compliance and have similar language in their regulatory or doctrinal manuals. I cite language from the Army’s manuals only because of my own service in the Army and familiarity with its policies and regulations.

Strict obedience is a requirement for military success, but issued orders must be lawful. In fact, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession states that, “[s]oldiers are bound to obey the legal and moral orders of their superiors; but they must disobey an unlawful or immoral order” (emphasis added).27 This language is unambiguous. The inclusion of the word must in the second clause of the sentence makes it clear that disobedience is the correct, appropriate, and obligatory response to receiving an order that violates the law.

ADP 6-22 further describes how a soldier should respond in such a scenario: “If Army professionals perceive that an order is unlawful or immoral, they seek situational understanding regarding the order and its original intent. This may include asking for clarification from the person who issued the order.”28 The military teaches the idea that principled disobedience to orders is the dutiful course of action. Even its most junior service members are instructed early on that they are under no obligation to obey an unlawful order and in fact have a duty to disobey such an order. Of course, this does not imply that all orders should be unduly questioned. This point will be addressed further in greater detail.

Much of what has been said or written recently about the importance of lawful and/or moral non-compliance within the military has been from the perspective of those receiving the orders and their response to those orders. Perhaps some of this stems from our natural tendency to support the underdog. We feel inspired by those speaking truth to power. We envision the junior service members of modest rank and experience and imagine how daunting it must be for those young troops to challenge their superiors.

This emphasis on those service members standing up against the institution is correct and entirely appropriate. These stories of courage offer hope that can inspire others. However, the stories of institutional failure must also be studied for the insights they provide as well.

That is why I feel a moral obligation to share about commanders so that we might also understand this problem from that perspective. The U.S. military has a field of largely sub-standard commanders leading America’s sons and daughters. Nothing about this problem has been solved. In fact, the problem has not even been adequately addressed because it remains so poorly understood.

I witnessed DoD’s covid response policies and their impacts firsthand. At the time the covid shot mandate went into effect, I was serving as the commander of a battalion within the 101st Airborne Division stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. I took command of the battalion in June of 2021, about two months before the mandate was implemented on August 24, 2021.

Before I share some of my personal story, I want to first explain the role of commanders in the military.

Military Command

Commanders are important because they are leaders. More than that, they are leaders of leaders. They are in charge of their units in every sense. Commanders are unique leaders specially selected for their assignments.

AR 600-20 Army Command Policy explains the essence of command: “Command is exercised by virtue of office and the special assignment of members of the Armed Forces of the United States holding military grade who are eligible to exercise command. A commander…exercises primary command authority over a military organization or a prescribed territorial area that is recognized as a “command…”29 Army Field Manual (FM) 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations further explains the importance of the command position: “Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates, including the authority to assign tasks and the responsibility for their successful completion.”30 Of note, this “authority to enforce orders by law is one of the key elements of command and distinguishes military commanders from other leaders and managers.”31

The military selects its premium leaders for command positions. These are the most important positions an officer can hold and are therefore the most highly coveted. Commanders are vested with significant authority to ensure they can dynamically lead their units amid the toughest conditions imaginable to deliver the results the nation requires and deserves. The U.S. military is a commander-driven force. This is necessary, proper, and wholly appropriate. The problem is not the magnitude of the role that commanders fill. However, the quality of commanders, good or bad, will create enduring effects on military readiness. The answer is not necessarily to give commanders less authority but to ensure the quality of the commanders is commensurate with the role they are selected to fulfill.

With respect to authority and responsibility, FM 6-0 states: “Commanders may delegate authority, but delegation does not absolve commanders of their responsibility to the higher echelon commander.”32 A commander retains responsibility at all times, and as AR 600-20 makes crystal clear, “[c]ommanders are responsible for everything their command does or fails to do.”33 The essence of command is summed up in that charge.

Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations explains the importance of leadership by commanders. It states that “[c]ommanders communicate their will to their formations through leadership.”34 The manual then expounds upon the importance of this leadership: “Sound leadership manifests as an unrelenting will to accomplish the mission, the ability to understand and adapt to changing conditions, and the motivation to persevere through hardship. Leadership inspires individuals to push past their perceived breaking point, and to fight for their unit and fellow Soldiers under the most difficult circumstances. It provides the intangible qualitative difference in how much combat power a formation can generate against enemy forces.”35

Notwithstanding this clear admonition, few commanders seemed prepared to adapt to the “changing conditions” the covid policies caused, and were thus unable to “persevere through [the] hardship” produced by the unlawful mandate.

My Command Experience

I had questioned the narratives offered about covid since early 2020 and did not believe the covid shot to be safe, effective, or necessary. Though I took command before the mandate, I knew that it was only a matter of time until it went into effect. The proverbial writing was on the wall, and I had informed my higher commanders that I would not take the shot. Personally, I did not trust the intent behind the mandate’s implementation and believed that much of what we were being told about the supposed covid health threat was untrue. I was prepared to refuse the covid shot and accept the corresponding personal consequences.

As a commander, I knew my actions would impact more than just me. I did not want to compel anyone in my unit to take the covid shot against their personal wishes. Shortly ahead of the announcement of the mandate, but knowing that it could come at any time, I met with the unvaccinated soldiers from each of the companies in my battalion. Though my own personal vaccination status was no secret in the battalion, I made it clear that my objective in meeting was not because I, too, was unvaccinated. I was performing what I saw as my due diligence as a commander by ensuring that my subordinates understood the significance of what was unfolding. I explained that at any time DoD was likely to implement a mandate and they needed to prepare for this eventuality. I explained that they needed to understand the ultimate impact their decision could have on their careers and lives. I also made it explicitly clear that I would not seek to influence anyone in any way as to what decision they should make. Though the mandate was not yet in effect at the time of these meetings, I knew that these soldiers had faced heavy coercion to take the shot before I had assumed command of the battalion. I wanted them to know that they would face zero coercion from me to either take the shot or refuse the shot. I also let them know that I was always available to speak with any of them one-on-one if they wanted to discuss their specific concerns with me personally. A few young soldiers took me up on that offer and later came to my office to discuss their circumstances with me.

Those with an overly caricatured view of the military may assume that the relationship between commanders and their subordinates is standoffish at best and adversarial at worst. This is, of course, untrue. Often, the commander is a soldier’s most important advocate. That said, it is still no small feat for a young, junior enlisted soldier to willingly visit his battalion commander’s office, regardless of how approachable the commander may be. And yet in this case, several did. As I listened intently to these young soldiers, some with tears in their eyes, I felt somewhat powerless to help. Despite how much I may have wished to, I could not absolve my soldiers of the consequences of whatever decision they would opt to make regarding the mandate. I could not even absolve myself of the impacts of my own decision to refuse the covid shot.

The one thing I could do was provide an example. I could demonstrate through my own personal actions that there is another way. Non-compliance with tyranny is an option, but it will come with consequences. As I had shared with the key leaders in my battalion upon my arrival, I believed in doing the right thing because it’s the right thing…consequences be damned.

To me, this is what every commander at my level should have been doing regardless of their personal views toward the shot. Even if they were true believers in the safety and efficacy of the shot, and supported the mandate as necessary, they still should have recognized the impact this policy was having on their troops. They should have supported those service members that did not want to take it. A small fraction of commanders who took the covid shots themselves did offer support to their subordinates that wanted to abstain, but the overwhelming majority did not.

Ultimately, I was relieved of command in late October, about four and a half months after initially taking command. Being relieved of command put me into a tiny minority; at the lieutenant colonel level and above, only two commanders in the active-duty Army were relieved for their refusal to comply with the covid shot mandate. The mandate violated the law, but that did not stop its unlawful implementation because commanders across the military failed in their duty to oppose the unlawful orders associated with the misguided policy. My peers and I could have stopped the mandate if enough commanders had exhibited the courage to say no to tyranny. Instead, the vast majority of commanders willingly, or in some cases begrudgingly, went along with unlawful policies that wrought physical and moral destruction on our forces. It was a wholesale rejection of what it means to command.

Most commanders simply complied with an order ultimately based on fraud between the FDA and DoD. Perhaps they were deceived into thinking the shots were safe and effective because they lacked the discernment to know they were being lied to. Or perhaps they felt uncomfortable taking the injections but lacked the initiative to resist. This latter description probably applies to many. Maybe they did not necessarily want to take the shot, and perhaps they felt appalled at having to order others to take the shots against their will, but they did not speak up and challenge the mandate either because they lacked the courage to do so or because they felt an obligation to support the policy. It may be hard to imagine how so many commanders could get things so wrong.

The Stewardship of Command

Command is difficult. It can be hard to appropriately balance the myriad demands a commander faces. I have been highly critical in the past of our military commanders.36 This is not now some attempt to excuse the inexcusable or defend those whose actions cannot be defended. This is, however, an attempt to further contextualize the situation by providing some insight into the environment in which commanders operate and provide some counsel to current or future commanders that may find themselves in similar situations. Those commanders owe it to themselves, their units, and this country to fully understand their role and the environment in which they command. DoD has not only operated outside the law but has punished those who failed to support its destructive policies while promoting those who chose loyalty to the institution at the expense of the law, the health of service members, or the trust of the American people.

Commanders are the true stewards of the institution, but sometimes they can misunderstand how best to manage the competing equities at play. Commanders are expected to be “on the team” and to demonstrate full support for their higher commanders and the institution. In general, this is admirable. Higher commanders do need support. The armed forces as a whole need commanders who uphold high standards. However, this support must not come at the expense of the principles we as Americans hold most dear. ADP 6-22 succinctly explains the concept of honorable service: “Honorable service is support and defense of the Constitution, the American people, and the national interest…Army professionals serve honorably by obeying the laws of the Nation and all legal orders. Army forces reject and report illegal, unethical, or immoral orders or actions.”37 Above all, commanders should embody this admonition to serve honorably thus inspiring others to do the same. Yet many commanders do not fully understand their role. They may have a moderate knowledge of their assigned duties but fail to adequately grasp the entirety of their charter or the true mantle of command.

Commanders know they are ultimately “responsible for all aspects of unit readiness.”38 Generally, a commander’s actions that enhance his unit’s readiness posture would be appropriate just as, in the general sense, compliance with orders is appropriate and necessary. However, orders must be consonant with the law, and where orders and law ever come into tension, a commander must fulfill his obligation to sustain the law even if it means disobeying the order. In much the same way, a commander’s focus must not be so oriented toward the reporting of readiness metrics that he tolerates breaches of integrity or violations of the law just to achieve high marks in the eyes of his higher commander. FM 6-0 drives home this essential point: “Commanders are legally and ethically responsible for their decisions and for the actions, accomplishments, and failures of their subordinates.”39 Those who are incapable of negotiating these challenges are unfit for command. They put their units at risk, destroy trust, and serve as poor examples to their subordinates.

To properly reject an unlawful order, one must first understand that it is unlawful. After all, many leaders, including commanders, did not understand the legal complications connected to the mandate. This claim of initial ignorance holds some validity though that validity has dropped precipitously as more time has passed. Due to the complicated legal machinations performed across various government organizations such as the FDA and DoD, it is completely understandable that military leaders would not have been aware of the full extent of the mandate’s legal problems. Higher commanders, senior leaders, and the military’s legal advisors – with very few exceptions – claimed the mandate was legal. Additionally, many commanders naturally assume the legal sufficiency of the orders they receive. However, over time – now more than four years since the implementation of the mandate – as more information has surfaced with respect to the problems associated with the mandate, any current ignorance has become willful and the continued failure to challenge the mandate and its enduring effects now implies support.

Let us return to this assumption that many commanders have that the orders they receive are lawful.

There is indeed an underlying expectation that orders issued will be legal. This “inference of lawfulness” is codified in the military’s Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), Part IV, 16: “An order requiring the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful, and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime” (emphasis added).40

Let us recall a point emphasized earlier. ADP 6-22 explains that “[u]nder normal circumstances, Soldiers and Army civilians trust their superior’s orders and execute them to the best of their ability” (emphasis added).41 After witnessing DoD openly violate the law with the support of virtually all senior leaders and commanders at every level, we must not delude ourselves by still believing the military is operating under the “normal circumstances” mentioned in the cited text. We may be justified in asking ourselves if conditions within the military have changed such that the “trust” mentioned in the included text above is no longer operative to the same degree it was prior to the military’s covid response policies.

Let us consider this further.

For the aforementioned “inference of lawfulness” mentioned in the MCM to be acceptable, the field of commanders must be of an exceptionally high ethical caliber. This inference has a built-in premise that unlawful orders in the military are so rare an occurrence that, absent overwhelming evidence to the contrary, orders should be considered lawful and carried out accordingly. This presumption, though bold, is not necessarily the problem. The lack of commanders capable of meeting the requirements to justify such a lofty inference is the problem. In other words, the solution is not to lower the standard by erasing the inference of lawfulness, but to elevate the quality of commanders that such a standard is truly applicable.

Trust

As mentioned in the text cited above from ADP 6-22, trust is an indispensable quality in military organizations. Trust, however, cannot be called into existence by decree. It can only be earned. If trust within a unit has been eroded due to unlawful or otherwise unethical behavior by the commander, then service members are less likely to operate on the assumption that subsequent orders are lawful or that the commander is acting in good faith. Organizations that don’t fully trust their commanders are unlikely to be high-performing units.

That there has been zero accountability for perhaps the most destructive policy the military has ever implemented does not do much to instill trust among service members, either with their leaders at the unit level or with senior Pentagon officials. The lack of accountability sends the message that the military is not bound by the laws of the nation it purports to defend. It calls into question the oaths military leaders have taken to support and defend the Constitution while acting in open defiance to that chief governing document. The idea that the armed forces are above the law is so dangerous that it should never enter the minds of either the troops or the minds of the American citizens that rely on the military to defend the country.

There is another reason that continued ignorance of the mandate’s legal problems is unacceptable after four years. ADP 6-22 offers important guidance into issuing clear orders and the responsibility to ensure the legality of orders received: “Leaders should not issue vague or ambiguous orders or instructions to avoid responsibility.”42 In other words, leaders should not issue intentionally vague orders that would permit the leader an element of plausible deniability should subordinates, in complying with the order, commit unacceptable actions that could be traced back to the leader who issued it. The manual continues: “Leaders have a responsibility to research relevant orders, rules, and regulations and to demand clarification of orders that could lead to criminal misinterpretation or abuse. Ultimately, Army leaders must accept responsibility for the consequences of their actions and the subordinates who execute the leader’s orders.”43 Ignorance is no excuse and is unbecoming a commander. At the first hint of a potential problem with the mandate, its implementation, or enforcement mechanisms, commanders should have researched the order and its background. They should have challenged the orders associated with the mandate. The widespread failure to do so led to the exact type of “criminal misinterpretation and abuse” that ADP 6-22 describes.

While mistakes do happen, even serious ones, the issuance of an unlawful order by a commander in the U.S. military should be incredibly rare. For it to happen at all, the commander giving the order must have a significant deficiency either in his legal understanding as it relates to his authorities or in his moral character. Neither type of deficiency is acceptable. Commanders do not operate in isolation. They have higher commanders, staff advisors, and even legal counsel that they can consult.

The Command Ethos

Our commanders have not adequately risen to the challenges the force has faced over the last few years. The collective weakness of those in command has resulted in serious physical and moral degradation of military readiness. Without a bold transformation of the command ethos, these problems will persist and may even be exacerbated should the military experience any potential tensions with the law in the future.

Commanders must understand the environment they are working in. Under the guise of covid response, the military violated the law, deprived its service members of their constitutionally protected rights, and punished those who resisted the tyrannical policies. More than four years later, there still has been no accountability for these crimes. Instead, the institution has rewarded compliance with its unlawful actions.

That is the current state of the military.

This means that the “inference of lawfulness” codified in the Manual for Courts-Martial is an unsound operating framework. It promotes passivity on the part of those receiving orders and is no longer relevant to the current environment. Rather than simply assuming that orders are legal unless obviously illegal, commanders should assume that at some point they may likely receive orders that conflict with the law. DoD’s oppressive covid response policies demonstrate the validity of this assumption. Commanders must exercise prudent scrutiny in evaluating the orders they receive. That does not necessarily mean that every order must be overly analyzed before complying, but it does mean that commanders must no longer assume the orders they receive are legal simply because the military hierarchy says they are. The majority of orders deal with rather routine tasks that don’t require a sustained, in-depth legal analysis. However, where complex constitutional or statutory factors may be at play, commanders must become comfortable ensuring legal sufficiency before simply obeying orders or passing down the orders to their own subordinates. To effectively lead their units, commanders must have a basic understanding of the law as it relates to their authorities. They must also exhibit the willingness to guard against unlawful activity. This does not mean that commanders must become legal experts; such an expectation would be as unrealistic as it is unnecessary. It is merely an acknowledgement that the same command mentality that has caused the current problems in the military is incapable of also offering appropriate solutions.

Moral courage is as important as physical courage. It is an indispensable requirement for leadership. Commanders are not just the face of their units, but also their first advocate. If a higher commander, or even DoD, issues an order or policy that violates the law, commanders should challenge the order rather than issuing the same order to their subordinates. True commanders shield their units from the ethical leadership failures from above rather than compounding those failures by simply passing them down to their own units.

If there is a single personal quality that the military seeks to build, it is leadership. That should come as no surprise. The desire for strong leadership is not even unique to military units. All types of organizations from corporate entities to sports teams have identified the need for inspirational leaders that can positively influence those around them.

This need for leadership is of paramount importance in military units given the nature of their duties. There is a fundamental reason the military focuses so heavily on developing leadership within its personnel at all levels. Throughout history, militaries have long recognized the difference in unit effectiveness that strong, dynamic leadership can accomplish. For example, FM 3-0 Operations states that “[l]eadership is the most essential dynamic of combat power…It is the multiplying and unifying dynamic of combat power, and it represents the qualitative difference between units.”44 Commanders are the foremost leaders of their respective units, but they cannot lead without the courage to do the right thing.

Commanders are the ultimate stewards of and within the profession of arms. It is up to the commanders to ensure that the military as an institution serves honorably and faithfully. As ADP 6-22 states, “[s]tewardship requires that Army professionals understand their duty represents a trust–it is an office. This responsibility is explicit in the oaths taken by Army officers…”45 Commanders are responsible for the culture they foster within their units. Commanders earn trust by setting high standards, leading by example, and advocating for their subordinates. Discipline is not just top-down but is instead a two-way street that requires effort up and down the chain of command.

Commanders are the prime movers within the military at all levels. Until they take their role more seriously, enduring change will be difficult. ADP 6-22 acknowledges the reality of the situations in which questionable orders may be given. Orders are often given amid extremely stressful conditions with limited information. The manual states that “[t]here is a risk when disobeying what is perceived to be an unlawful or immoral order–and it may be the most courageous decision an Army professional ever makes.”46 The military needs commanders with the moral courage to make the right decision regardless of the consequences for doing so.

There must be a full restoration of a true command ethos within the military. Given the current disregard for the law across the military, such a shift is unlikely to be directed from the top. Commanders must reshape the ethos through their personal actions. They must take it upon themselves to rebuild the culture of lawfulness and moral rectitude. In so doing, they will influence not only their subordinates, but also their peers and even their superiors to do the same.

As I have written previously elsewhere:

No commander should expect command to be easy. Candidates are not selected for command because of their ability to make the right decision when it’s obvious what to do. Commanders are necessary because it’s not always obvious what the right answer is. Commanders are expected to weigh competing requirements and make decisions amid limited resources. Commanders are expected to fully understand risk and balance that against opportunity. Commanders are expected to operate under time constraints and with complete information. They are expected to exercise sound judgment.

A commander who is only capable of making the right decision when it’s easy to do so is no commander at all.47

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Jules W. Hurst III, “Supplemental Guidance to the Military Department Discharge Review Boards and Boards for Correction of Military / Naval Records Considering Requests from Service Members Adversely Impacted by Coronavirus Disease 2019 Vaccination Requirements,” May 7, 2025, accessed January 11, 2026, https://www.war.gov/Portals/1/Spotlight/2025/Guidance_For_Federal_Policies/Supplemental-Guidance-to-the-Military-Department-Discharge-Review-Boards-and-Boards-for-Correction-of-Military-Naval-Records.pdf. This memorandum codified in writing what current Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth had previously mentioned in a video posted to his X account on April 23, 2025 about the unlawful orders associated with the mandate, accessed January 11, 2026,

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth@SecWar

An update on COVID-19 reinstatements.

10:02 PM · Apr 23, 2025 · 2.76M Views

2.81K Replies · 6.12K Reposts · 27.8K Likes