In my previous External Key Store versus Managed HSM post I claimed Managed HSM was safer, had better SLA support, much higher SLA and the risk of key compromise was lower. Still, here we are: Microsoft announced the exact same feature with the same architecture on Managed HSM (MHSM). Apparently, some customers do require their [ ]
I deliberately moved this chapter to the end; not because AI is less important, but because it is often treated as the starting point in sovereignty discussions. In reality, it sits on top of everything we’ve already covered. AI is frequently used as the primary argument by hyperscalers, and in many conversations it becomes the [ ]
This is where the conversation gets uncomfortable, because for all of the removing emotions, the structured risk models, and trade-offs we’ve discussed so far; sovereignty discussions are not just about facts. They are also about perception, and that perception is often shaped by how “Big Tech” is viewed. Organizations may try to stay grounded in [ ]
Time to get real.. we talked about all the things we need to take into account. If all is well, we understand difference between hyperscale and any other option. Also that hyperscale today provides real value (at multiple costs) and that we should not expect a European (or any other for that matter) hyperscaler soon. [ ]
In our previous posts, we discussed sovereignty as a risk, the trade-offs that come with it, and the reality of Europe building its own hyperscale ecosystem. The conclusion we derived from that is not comfortable, but it is essential: There is no architectural pattern, provider choice, or regulatory construct that fully removes sovereignty risk. Not [ ]
In the past few posts we ve discussed how to address Sovereignty as a risk, what the trade-offs are and now its the why can t we build this ourselves chapter. This is more of an economic background chapter.. but the next post (4) will be about mitigations.. History of hyperscale Hyperscale did not appear overnight. It [ ]
in our previous posts I ve described that sovereignty risks are risks that should be evaluated as such. Risks require evaluation that in turn require acceptance or mitigations. Why would we accept a risk, what benefits outweigh that risk, and what options do we have. That s todays topic. In most discussions, the goal is framed as [ ]
In the intro I talked about treating sovereignty as a risk. Risks that need to be clarified and put in perspective. Risks are accepted/mitigated based on probability and impact. In sovereignty discussions we often talk about: Now, I m not going to deny these risks exist. Nor am I going to say you should neglect or [ ]
This blog is mostly technical, but over the last few years I’ve focussed on the sovereignty aspect of public cloud (well before it became the topic everyone is talking about now). Most current discussions tend to reduce sovereignty to jurisdiction alone, often concluding with: “We can only be sovereign by hosting in Europe.” In the [ ]
I’ve talked about sovereignty in Azure (or cloud in general) before.. and we are going to dive a little deeper into it this time. What is it, how do you configure it, and what guardrails can you put in place? TLDR: I’ve created a few policies that mandate Managed HSM encryption for (supporting) Azure Services. [ ]