The F-35 Saga: Bright Idea Time

I didn’t plan on writing another fighter-jet piece… but here we are. This debate has gone so far off the rails that it needs one more bright idea.

Frankly, I’m finding the topic exhausting as everyone and their dog is entering the discussion, usually with one message: buy the SAAB Gripen E and dump the F-35, consequences be damned. The urge to tell the Americans where to go and to tell Trump to suck eggs is almost overwhelming for some, and it’s a sentiment that I understand completely, as regular readers will know.

Regular readers will also know that I believe things are never as simple as they seem and that situations are usually much more complex than made out. This is certainly the case with the fighter replacement project, as I’ve attempted – somewhat unsuccessfully it seems – to articulate in prior articles. So, I’m going to break a rule and indulge in a Bright Idea. Military planners, and I was one for many years, hate Bright Ideas with a passion because they often arrive out of the blue in the planning cycle, disrupting thought processes and being generally annoying. The Bright Idea Fairy is a plague to planners. Nevertheless, I think that, with the repeated delays to the final fighter decision and the copious amount of misinformation and politically inspired manoeuvring, it’s time to cut to the chase and make an actual recommendation. I’ve done this in the past, but perhaps it’s time to take things a step further.

First, my usual caveats. I was an Army senior planner, trained in Joint Operations and taught how to fuse political considerations with military necessity. I back this up with civilian post-graduate training in strategic studies and a few years of direct experience. What I am definitely not is a fighter pilot or engineer. While I can research the capabilities of aircraft and have a passing knowledge of systems and weapons, I am not an expert in the technical intricacies of this or that airplane. I cannot and will not get into the various systems unless they directly impact my analysis. I am open to correction by genuine experts anytime and it is more than possible that my arguments have serious flaws. But something has to be said.

In the end, I don’t really care what fighter aircraft Canada buys if it meets the operational requirements of the Air Force and – and this is important – the political requirements of the Government of Canada.

With all that out of the way, here we go.

• Canada has paid for 16 F-35s and will take delivery of those aircraft

• 16 aircraft do not have the critical mass to be an operational fighter capability

• The government will proceed with additional F-35 purchases to create a viable capability, up to the full 88 aircraft

• The United States, for operational and political reasons, will put tremendous pressure on Canada to proceed with the full F-35 purchase

• Trump will punish Canada if we do not proceed with the full purchase

• Canada wishes to pivot away from the United States towards Europe and other nations

• Canada wishes to further develop an independent defence industrial base

• Sweden has made multiple overtures to Canada to form a defence partnership and has offered very attractive packages, including co-production of the Gripen E+ aircraft in Canada and several other incentives to move away from the F-35.

• The Canadian public is placing tremendous pressure on the Government to demonstrate our independence and have seized upon the F-35 purchase as a means to do so.

• Gripen E+ can come close to matching the F-35 in some areas, but the F-35 remains a superior aircraft in most respects.

The saga of Canada’s effort to replace the CF-18 is too long and convoluted to bear repeating here. I have covered it in previous pieces on this subject, and it has been the topic of exhaustive discussion. Suffice it to say that this issue has been ongoing for decades; it is time to put it to bed and get on with it.

Canada has three commitments for which it requires advanced jet fighters: the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and expeditionary and contingency operations. Of these, NORAD is arguably the most important and our commitment to it drives many of the requirements for choosing a fighter aircraft. These requirements certainly drove the selection of the F-35 for the RCAF.

NORAD. As I have argued in the past, NORAD essentially exists to defend the United States – and its nuclear deterrent in particular. Canada’s defence is certainly secondary to this objective and Canada remains a junior partner. NORAD’s role is to detect and warn and the two countries are completely integrated at the operational level. This includes tasking, communications, intelligence, and systems. Indeed, this integration is so thorough that, during the last fighter competition, both the British and French aircraft withdrew because they were unable to meet the integration requirements. The Gripen doesn’t meet some of these requirements, which is why it wasn’t the winner of the competition; this basic fact remains unchanged.

The F-35 was selected in large part because it could be fully integrated with the US Air Force. This requires systems over and above what would typically be needed for NATO operations, including a demand to access US classified data feeds and networks, along with communications systems. The Americans would be unwilling to place these systems in a foreign-built aircraft. This makes the F-35 the only real option should Canada wish to remain a fully functional part of NORAD. The alternative is to see US aircraft conducting interceptions and possible shootdowns in Canadian airspace because Canada will be locked out of the so-called “kill chain”.

Some have argued that Canada is risking being at the mercy of a US “kill switch” or some other means of disabling our aircraft should we select the F-35. I deem this to be highly unlikely. Canada is to receive the Block 4 version of the F-35, the most advanced, and it is likely to be very close – if not identical – to the version flown by the US Air Force. Why? Because, as I noted earlier, NORAD exists to defend the United States and giving Canada an inferior aircraft or one that can be disabled directly affects US defence interests. It would not make sense to shut down RCAF aircraft if those aircraft are defending the United States.

NORAD is not going away, and we are spending billions to upgrade our warning systems specifically because they’re needed for NORAD operations. The United States will look very unkindly on an aircraft that cannot be fully integrated with their operations for continental defence. This remains true whether or not Trump is in office. My conclusion is that we need the F-35 for NORAD purposes. (As an aside, this is why RCAF retired generals are so set on the F-35, not because of some conspiracy with Lockheed Martin, which does plenty of other business with Canada and is making hundreds of aircraft for the US).

NATO. The requirements for NATO are somewhat different. A NATO role requires that the aircraft be interoperable with other NATO allies. This means compatible communications and data systems along with compatible weapons. A Canadian aircraft would need Link 16 data links and a variety of electronic warfare systems to defeat an aggressor (ie: Russian) radars and aircraft. Further, the aircraft would be required to operate in both a strike and close air support role and be capable of working alongside any of our allies. Both the F-35 and Gripen can do this without modification. The idea that we need the F-35 for NATO purposes is somewhat disingenuous as the Gripen is perfectly capable of defeating a Russian adversary. Indeed, the Gripen’s ability to operate from dispersed locations and its simplicity may make it more suitable to NATO operations than the F-35 – at least in a Canadian context. Frankly, despite the fact that the F-35 is flown by many of our European allies, the Gripen may be preferable in this role.

Expeditionary and Contingency Operations. People forget that Canada routinely employs fighter aircraft for contingency purposes. We flew combat operations during Operation DESERT STORM, over Bosnia and Serbia, over Libya, and against ISIS in Iraq using the CF-18. It is prudent to plan for the continuation of such operations, with or without the Americans. In such eventualities, it is useful to have an aircraft that can operate from austere locations with a minimum of support demands. A continency fighter will still need to integrate with allies – in a manner similar to NATO operations. In these types of scenarios, full fusion with the US Air Force becomes somewhat less important, although it is still useful. This leads me to think that the Gripen is preferable in this role as well.

Quantity is a Quality All of its Own. Canada has been shrinking its fighter force for decades. During the 1950s we had an entire fighter wing based in Europe, along with a robust contribution to NORAD at home. Since then, with every purchase, our fighter force has been shrinking. Canada procured 138 CF-18s in the early 1980s and deployed two full squadrons (24 aircraft) to Qatar for Operation DESERT STORM. We cannot do this now, and the RCAF typically plans for the deployment of a “six pack” of fighters – a mere six aircraft – for contingency operations as the CF-18 fleet has continued to shrink over the last three decades. Canada is currently slated to receive 88 F-35 aircraft. Some commentators – and I am one – have argued that this is insufficient to maintain our commitment to NORAD and to NATO concurrently. After all, if a conflict breaks out with Russia in Europe, the North American continent cannot be regarded as immune from Russian attacks. I’m not even sure the RCAF is planning for this worst-case scenario.

So, with the roles out of the way, it’s likely time to address the massive amounts of disinformation, obfuscation, and contractor propaganda that have swamped the discussion of this entire issue. Let’s take them one by one.

The Americans Have a Kill Switch!

No, they don’t and the use of the phrase deliberately inflames the rhetoric surrounding the discussion. Canada is slated to get the most advanced version of the F-35. It is deliberately designed to be integrated into both the US and NATO systems. This means just in time delivery of spare parts and software common across Allied platforms. Much of this is controlled by the United States, although spares can come from any of the nations participating in F-35 production. The issue becomes with the “just in time” delivery and central warehousing of spare parts, which the US by and large controls.

Further, the US will control access to software updates. They can’t “brick” the aircraft, but they can ensure that capabilities are limited or restricted. BMW does this, much to my annoyance, with its cars. The car will still function, but it won’t be the latest version and may not perform as well.

Finally, it defies common sense to suggest that the US would simply “kill” an aircraft that is, in the end, dedicated to its own defence.

Gripen Can Land on Highways!

Yes, it can. So can an F-35 or an CF-18 for that matter. The latter did only last month during Exercise COBRA WARRIOR in Finland.

The Gripen is designed for ease of maintenance and for dispersed operations. This is because Sweden developed it while it was a neutral nation expecting to defend against a Russian attack alone. It has an entire system of road-based runways and dispersed maintenance and arming facilities throughout the country. Canada has no such system.

The argument is that this could be a useful capability in the North, but I fail to see how. Supersonic aircraft are limited to paved surfaces, of which there are few in the far north. Further, there is no cover for concealment in most locations above the treeline. This has limited Canada’s northern fighter presence to Forward Operating Locations with paved runways. This limitation holds true for the CF-18, the F-35, and the Gripen.

The warning time and standoff distance for NORAD tasks means that operation of our fighter fleet from fixed bases in the south is viable; the only way they can be attacked without warning is by missile strike and we would need warning to disperse aircraft to austere locations in any event.

Where this capability is useful is in Europe, in those countries that have developed a dispersal system with the infrastructure and equipment to support it. This is where the Gripen could have an advantage, especially if we consider deploying to defend NATO’s northern flank alongside Sweden and Finland.

Gripen Brings Jobs and We’ll Totally Revitalize our Aerospace Industry!

This is a bit harder to quantify or forecast. Canada largely abrogated its ability to produce high-end fighter aircraft in the 1970s. This was done deliberately as aircraft grew more expensive and complex and as Canada elected to shift procurement to the United States. It has been a matter of policy to select American fighter aircraft since the 1960s.

The F-35 is already in production and hundreds of aircraft have been delivered across most of Canada’s major allies. Construction of these has been spread out between the members of the original fighter development consortium, including Canada. For instance, Magellan Aerospace in Winnipeg is already producing F-35 components and roughly 6000 jobs relate to this effort.

SAAB has been making a lot of promises regarding jobs in Canada and has, more importantly, dangled the prospect of full production or assembly of the Gripen in Canada, possibly for export. At this point, it’s difficult to assess how realistic these prospects are. The Gripen E is just entering production now, with an assembly line in Brazil. Sweden should follow shortly. The relative simplicity of the Gripen lends itself well to dispersed production and Canada would have little difficulty setting up a line here. The number of jobs promised has been touted as somewhere in the neighbourhood of 11000, but this is largely vapourware, as it’s impossible to determine how much of the downstream, systems-based production would be transferred to Canadian companies.

Would Gripen put Canada back in the fighter game? Perhaps. The temptation to give it a shot is very great. We are, after all, more than capable of producing a jet fighter, we have just decided not to. But as sugarplums dance in our heads, we must remember that there are thousands of jobs already connected to the F-35 and that we risk losing those should we be too drastic.

But We Can’t Trust the Americans and Fuck Trump

This is a view that I have some sympathy for. The urge to make a dramatic gesture that vividly demonstrates our shift away from American hegemony is almost overwhelming. Indeed, I have regularly argued for just such a shift, including in defence procurement. However, in this case, the decision should be more measured and deliberate.

First, Canada will never use fighter aircraft to defend against a US invasion. I, and many others, have tried to address this fever dream – to little effect. For Canada to have the critical mass to mount even a token defence against American aggression, we would need a fighter fleet several times the size of what we’re planning. US power is so overwhelming and so out of scale that few countries on the planet can mount an effective defence. I think we need to cease this line of thinking – it gets us nowhere.

Second, Trump will be gone long before the bulk of either the Gripen or the F-35 can be delivered. Cancellation of the F-35 may send a message, but it will soon be lost as the Administration changes.

Third, the blowback from the Trump administration to cancellation of the F-35 could be considerable. Even the most benign of US administrations would be pushing Canada extremely hard to stay the course and proceed with the full contract. The US regards the F-35 as being critical to NORAD and thus to its own defence. Further, we must remember that Canada has bought and paid for 16 F-35s already. These aircraft are under contract and are coming unless Canada completely shuts it down and defaults. We are extremely unlikely to do so, as the rupture with the Americans would be considerable and extend across the US government, no matter who is in power.

The Gripen is a Better Aircraft!

Objectively, it is not. The F-35 won the original fighter competition against the Gripen by a considerable margin. That’s not to say that the Gripen E isn’t a fine aircraft. It is. However, it is a 4 or 4.5 generation fighter without stealth capability, without some of the weapons available to the F-35, and without some of the networked capability and classified datalinks produced by the Americans. Could Canada fly the Gripen in a NORAD role? Possibly – if we’re talking about the Gripen E. What we do know is that both the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Dassault Rafale withdrew from the competition because they couldn’t meet NORAD requirements. That says something.

Frankly, there’s a reason that the Gripen E is so cheap and has been exported only to a handful of countries: it is less capable. There’s nothing wrong with that at all; a less complex aircraft has many benefits. But we must be clear-headed about what we’d be getting.

Finally, the Gripen itself isn’t much more “sovereign” than the F-35. Like the F-35, it is integrated into Western production chains; the engine is American, along with avionics and other systems. It is indeed more sovereign than the F-35, but again we have to remember what we’d be getting.

Canada has dithered and wrung its hands over this purchase for decades and its time to make a decision. It is a huge buy, complicated by the fact that the RCAF has been told to expect the F-35. We have pilots training on it now, infrastructure being planned and built, and aircraft purchased. Turning this boat around is going to be difficult.

Moreover, the RCAF has very significant personnel issues and has had difficulty in producing and retaining pilots. Its system is under severe strain and the Air Force will be extremely reluctant to add to the tension by switching aircraft midstride or adding an additional fighter to the inventory, thus complicating both training and maintenance. These are the concerns that led retired air force general officers to publicly advocate for the F-35, not any self-serving connection to Lockheed Martin.

Having said all this, politics do intervene. I’m a vocal advocate of keeping politics out of defence procurement and am reluctant to insert them here. However, we must. The United States has treated Canada with distain and hostility for years now. We are attempting to pivot our economy and our security arrangements away from the US. A message must be sent and we have new allies to consider. NATO is just as important – perhaps more important – to Canada’s security than NORAD and it is critical that we demonstrate our commitment to Europe and our collective security. Buying Gripen E does just that.

I understand Canada’s dithering. There is a very large constituency in this country that believes defence is a waste and that any major purchases are unnecessary. These voices have been fairly quiet as of late, but the sentiment is still alive and well in some quarters. Making matters worse, the geopolitical situation has changed immensely, and public sentiment is hardly pro-American. The Government is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t. But a decision must be made and made soon.

Barring a complete break with the US, Canada is getting the F-35, like it or not. 16 aircraft are too few to sustain a viable fleet. We must allow for training, maintenance, and attrition. This means contracting for more to create a combat-effective capability. While I have argued for a reduction in F-35 numbers, we can anticipate that Canada will contract for all 88 aircraft being planned.

So far no change. But I think we need to be bold and look beyond the F-35 to get our fighter numbers up, to address training throughput and, most importantly, demonstrate our commitment to NATO. With this in mind, we could:

• Contract with SAAB for (say) four squadrons of Gripen Es.

• Insist that the aircraft be built/assembled in Canada with as many Canadian-produced components as possible.

• Include provisions for export Gripens, particularly those destined for Ukraine, to be produced in Canada.

• Explore the possibility of a joint training programme with Sweden, to include ab initio training though to Gripen graduation. Indeed, we could look at splitting all flying training between Canada and Sweden.

• Station two Gripen squadrons in Europe, co-located with Swedish aircraft and under NATO operational control. These would be available for NATO Air Policing tasks and, in wartime, for direct support of the Canadian brigade in Latvia.

• Arrange, as part of the basing agreement, shared use of maintenance and spares support systems in Sweden.

• The two remaining squadrons would be held in Canada for training, for contingency expeditionary operations, for NATO reinforcement, and for surge support to NORAD.

As indicated earlier, the Gripen E is, despite the very significant improvements made over the original Gripen, somewhat inferior to the F-35. However, it is more than capable of acting in a NATO capacity, particularly if it were to serve alongside the Royal Swedish Air Force, where its positive attributes can be exploited to the full.

Military planners hate all the above. Bright ideas interrupt the planning process, dislocate decisions already made, and are sometimes not grounded in reality. That may well be the case here – I’m just a retired old Army guy – but I honestly don’t know. What I do know is that Canada needs to make a decision and to make one soon - and commit to it. There will be political blowback no matter what that decision is and no one will be happy. The RCAF wants an all-F-35 fleet, for valid reasons. Canadian nationalists want to dump the F-35 and poke Trump in the eye. Canada’s pacifist streak will squirm at any hint of such large defence purchases, money that – in their view – could be better spent elsewhere.

But we need to be strategic and to build the pivot while acknowledging geopolitical realities. We will not fully escape being under the American umbrella but there are things we can do – now. It is time to be bold and imaginative in how Canada defends itself and our allies. Let’s get on with it.