ENDLESS WAR, an overview

Israel has now been battling the Islamists who seek to destroy it for three years and there is no end in sight. True, President Trump, who had partnered with Israel in its six-week war against Iran, has managed to impose a ceasefire on Israel and its various antagonists. But this will in all probability turn out to be a temporary pause in the hostilities, which are likely to be renewed in a few days’, weeks’ or months’ time.

The Islamists’ war on the “Little Satan,” Israel – part of their more general multifaceted assault on the West, which is headed by the “Great Satan,” America - began on 7 October 2023, with the Palestinian Hamas’ surprise assault on southern Israel, in which 1200 Israelis, most of them civilians, including some 30 American citizens, were slaughtered and 250 taken hostage back to the Gaza Strip, the Hamas’s base. Of course, that attack, however savage, by some 30,000 lightly armed fighters could not be decisive. But the Hamas’s leader, Yahya Sinwar, calculated that the offensive would trigger, perhaps immediately, parallel attacks on the infidel Jewish state by fellow Islamists, who could not long remain on the sidelines – and he likely hoped that the eventual multilateral, multi-front assault would bring about Israel’s demise.

Unfortunately, his calculus (if not hope) panned out. Lebanon’s powerful Shi’ite Islamist group, the Hezbollah (the party of God) joined in the following day, rocketing Israel’s northern Galilee region and a few days later the Houthi militia, which controls the north and west of Yemen, began launching ballistic missiles and drones toward Israel. Somewhat later even the Shi’ite militias in Iraq contributed their two bits with occasional rocket and drone launches

Israel responded with constant aerial strikes and, on the Gaza border, with a massive ground invasion. Israel’s prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, promised that the Hamas would be crushed once and for all (bouts of Israeli-Hamas hostilities in the previous two decades had all ended inconclusively). Hamas and Gaza’s civilian population, among whom the Islamist fighters were embedded and from whom they had sprung, suffered massive casualties, mainly from the air strikes, despite Israeli efforts to limit collateral casualties. And though the IDF managed after many months of fighting to occupy some 55% of the Gaza Strip and destroy most of the territory’s infrastructure and much of its urban housing, the Hamas remained standing, the vast tunnel system the organization had built (and from which Hamas barred the area’s civilians) providing most of the fighters with adequate protection. But thousands of Hamas fighters, maybe 20,000, died, including Sinwar and almost all the organization’s “brigade” and “battalion” commanders. But Hamas small arms, RPGs and anti-tank missiles (and “friendly” fire) killed some five hundred Israeli soldiers and wounded many thousands before Trump imposed a ceasefire and halt in place order on Israel in October 2025. The ceasefire agreement included a Hamas commitment to disarm and an Israeli promise to withdraw more or less back to the international border. Neither has so far happened and neither is likely to happen in the foreseeable future.

The protracted fight between Israel and the Hamas and Trump’s periodic interventions achieved one major success – the release of all the still living Israeli hostages (some had been murdered by the Hamas and a few had died from Israeli fire) and the handover of the bodies of the dead hostages. Trump’s intercessions, and cumulative international pressure, also resulted in large humanitarian aid convoys continuously reaching the Gaza population, which had largely been uprooted from its homes in the course of the fighting and by war’s end was living in makeshift tent encampments amid and between the ruins. Hamas confiscated much of this humanitarian aid (food, medical supplies, etc.) and then sold it to Gaza’s merchants, thus making a profit with which it was able to finance its war-making and the salaries of the thousands of young Gazans it recruited as the war raged to beef up its diminishing numbers.

In orchestrating the Gaza ceasefire Trump was motivated by a desire to see the hostages released (he was visibly moved by their plight in the Hamas tunnels) and to bolster his image as a universal peace-maker (he was wont to boast that he had stopped nine wars), and partly in the hope of winning a Nobel Peace prize. (Four previous US presidents have won the prize – Theodore Roosevelt, in 1906, for mediating an end to the Russo-Japanese War; Woodrow Wilson, in 1919, for helping found the League of Nations; Jimmy Carter, in 2002, for promoting Israeli-Egyptian peace and, more generally, for advancing human rights; and Barack Obama, in 2009, for achieving nothing.)

In Gaza, Hamas happily embraced the ceasefire, which put an end to the IDF pressure and Israel acceded to it because of American insistence. Netanyahu believed he had no choice because of Israel’s reliance on American munitions, spare parts and weapons and political protection (for example, American vetoes subverting anti-Israeli resolutions in the UN Security Council, potentially threatening sanctions). Down the road, Netanyahu was to bow to further Trump diktats, relating to ceasefires or munitions’ targeting, for the same reasons.

The war in Gaza, with its tremendous cost in Palestinian lives and devastation, steadily undermined public support in the West for Israel and an outbreak of antisemitism against Jews across the planet, despite the facts that Hamas had started the war and aimed at Israel’s destruction (and said so publicly) and despite the facts that world Jewry was not responsible for Israel’s actions and that many Jews opposed them. Underlying the wave of anti-Israeli activism and the outbreak of antisemitism were the steady increase of Muslims, with traditional antisemitic core beliefs, living in the West and peopling its universities, who automatically support Muslim\Arab communities and actions, whether right or wrong; the Israeli government’s policies and behavior over the past decades toward the Palestinians, especially in the West Bank, and their representation in Western tv screens and the press; the vile right-wing Israeli government, with its authoritarian values and agenda, and the corrupt, indeed despicable person, of its leader, Netanyahu; the general ignorance among youngsters in the West, especially university students, regarding the history, and rights and wrongs, of the 140-year-old Arab-Israeli conflict; and the growing chronological distance from the Holocaust, which in the past had rallied world opinion in favor of the creation and existence of Israel as a haven for the much-persecuted Jewish people.

During the Israel-Hamas war, retaliatory Israeli air assaults on the Houthis decapitated that militia and destroyed the Red Sea ports through which Iranian arms shipments had entered the country, and effectively neutered that organization.

But the Hezbollah, with perhaps 50,000 fighters, many of them with combat experience from warring with Israel and participating in the civil war in Syria, where they helped prop up the tyrannical Assad regime, proved a more resilient foe, especially with most of Israel’s energies focused on Gaza.

But in September-October 2024 Netanyahu at last agreed to fully engage the Hezbollah and unleashed the full power of the Mossad and the Israel Air Force (IAF). The Mossad had prepared well and on 17-18 September beepers and walkie-talkies exploded simultaneously in the hands and pockets of Hezbollah operatives around Lebanon, maiming thousands, and the organization itself. Then, on 27 September, Israeli fighter-bombers assassinated Hezbollah’s legendary leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and many of the organization’s top brass. The IAF subsequently demolished Hezbollah’s long-range rocket stockpiles. At the end of November, Trump imposed a ceasefire on the two sides, which included a halt to Israeli ground operations along the Israel-Lebanon border and Hezbollah agreement to withdraw from southern Lebanon and disarm.

A side-effect of the devastation of the Hezbollah was the December 2024 fall of the Assad regime, which Hezbollah had helped prop up. Anti-Assad Islamist forces based in north-western Syria’s Idlib Province - supported with arms and intelligence by Turkey - in November 2024 surged southward and by early December occupied Damascus as the Syrian national army disintegrated and President Bashar Assad fled to Moscow. Syria’s rebel Sunni Islamist forces, led by Ahmed a-Sharaa, had for years fought the Iranian and Hezbollah forces helping Assad, and once in power, a Sharaa closed off the Syrian-Lebanese border to arms transfers from Iran to Hezbollah, further weakening the Lebanese Islamists and the Iranian-constructed proxy “ring of fire” around Israel.

During the Israeli-Hamas and Israeli-Hezbollah clashes, Iran had hoped that the homeland would remain out of the fray and unharmed. But Iran eventually got directly sucked in. On 31 July 2024 the Mossad assassinated Ismail Haniya, Hamas’s political chief, while he was visiting Tehran and under the protection of the IRGC. And, in fighting the Hezbollah, Israel in April and July 2024 killed a cluster of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps generals in Damascus and Beirut who were liaising with or helping orchestrate the Hezbollah war-making.

Iranian “honor” had been assailed and Iran responded with two massive ballistic missile and drone barrages against Israel in April and October 2024 and, at the same time, stepped up its efforts to achieve nuclear weaponry (while continuing to tell the world that it had no interest in acquiring such weapons). With the other fronts temporarily on hold, in June 2025 Israel retaliated with a surprise 12-day aerial offensive against Iran, its F-15s, F-16s and F-35s first taking out air defense capabilities and key military leaders and nuclear scientists and then devastating IRGC bases, ballistic missile capabilities and production sites and nuclear project installations. Iran responded with ballistic missile and drone attacks on Israeli civilian centers and strategic installations. Near the end of the Israeli campaign, American bombers joined the battle and, using heavy large bunker-busting bombs (which Israel did not possess), demolished the underground chambers of the Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan nuclear complexes. Then Trump (again) called it quits and declared a ceasefire which was eagerly sought by Tehran, even ordering Netanyahu to recall dozens of Israeli aircraft on their way to Iran to cause additional devastation.

Given Israel’s efficient early-warning systems, sophisticated anti-missile missile systems (Arrow 2s and 3s) and public and private (home) shelters, only a handful of Israelis were killed or injured, but the 10% of Iranian missiles that got through caused extensive material damage, especially in Tel Aviv and its suburbs.

And then the Israeli-American conflict with Iran, dormant for months, peaked. Starting on 28 February 2026 and during the following weeks, the American and Israeli air forces jointly attacked the Islamist “head of the snake” (in Israeli terminology), hitting Iran’s anti-aircraft systems, IRGC and Basij militia bases, the Iranian army and its air and naval forces, ballistic missile storage and launch sites and its production infrastructure, and the remaining nuclear installations and capabilities. The operation was initiated after Israeli and American intelligence services assessed that Iran had refurbished its ballistic missile capabilities more quickly than had been forecast and because Iran had substantially advanced its nuclear weapons program. Trump had long announced his resolve not to allow Iran nuclear weapons and Netanyahu had apparently persuaded him that a joint Israeli-American air assault could topple the Islamist regime and put an end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions as well as to the ballistic missile program (which American intelligence feared would soon produce weapons capable of reaching the US).

The Iranians responded with ballistic missile and drone attacks on Israel and US bases around the Middle East and, surprisingly, on military and economic installations in the Arab gulf states, Bahrein, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (all American allies), and on Qatar and Oman, two gulf states friendly toward Iran. Iran and its proxies also launched a handful of missiles and drones at a British base in Cyprus, at Azerbaijan and at Turkey (a NATO member). In addition Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz – linking the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean – using drones, missiles and mines and the threat of their use against international shipping (later allowing through some Iran-“friendly” vessels).

The war was asymmetric on various levels. Militarily, the Americans and Israelis radically outgunned the Iranians, who had no air force to speak of and poor-quality anti-aircraft defenses whereas the sophisticated American and Israeli aircraft bombed Iran almost at will and shot down most of Iran’s primitive ballistic missiles and drones (Israel shot down 80-90%). But for the Iranian regime, the war was existential and, literally, threatened the lives of the regime’s fighters and their families whereas the Americans (though not the Israelis) were fighting an enemy that was no immediate threat to the homeland, its inhabitants or the governing administration. Moreover, the Iranian regime, after slaughtering tens of thousands of protesters a month before, was free to gamble with its citizens’ lives and conduct itself without domestic constraints whereas Trump, assailed and hedged in by a growingly antagonistic domestic public opinion and a divided Congress and recalcitrant allies, all energized by an unfolding energy crisis caused by the Hormuz blockade, was eager to end the fighting within weeks of its start and proved almost immovably reluctant to renew the warfare after his first announcement of a ceasefire on 6 April.

The well-coordinated Israeli-American assault began on 28 February with a surprise Israeli morning strike at a gathering of Iran’s military leadership in the Supreme Leader’s Tehran housing complex. The assailants had been tracking Ali Khamenei’s movements, from one hideaway to the next, for weeks and knew that that morning he would meet his key aides, and where. In a matter of seconds, Khamenei and dozens of Iran’s top IRGC and army leaders were dead, and Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, who was subsequently declared his father’s successor as Supreme Leader (though real power remained in the hands of the remaining IRGC heads), was seriously injured.

The Iranian closure of the strait, through which 20% of Europe’s, Asia’s and Africa’s energy imports flowed, caused an immediate surge in oil and gas prices worldwide, including in the US, subverting domestic support for Trump’s war. After the initial wave of strikes failed to topple the Islamist regime or even bring out (again) onto the streets the protesting masses, the American president began seeking an offramp. But Iran’s new leaders, possibly even more radical than those assassinated on 28 February, were unwilling to give him one. So, by week five of the war, Israeli aircraft began nibbling at Iran’s civilian infrastructure, destroying key steel works and petro-chemical plants, and a major bridge, and Trump threatened to expand the war by going after Iran’s power (electricity) plants and its oil and gas installations, paralyzing if not destroying the Iranian economy for years to come. In addition, the US announced a blockade of its own, of Iran’s ports and the Strait of Hormuz at its eastern end. Fearing economic and social collapse, Tehran was persuaded to call it quits and Trump declared a ceasefire (including also by Israel), and then repeatedly extended it to allow time for a negotiated settlement.

Meanwhile it is unclear if America’s position as a world power has gained or lost from the clash with Iran. Certainly the conflict has benefited Russia, redirecting Western assets and energies away from the war in Ukraine and increasing Putin’s earnings from fuel exports (some of which are currently sanctioned by Washington in its desire to keep oil prices down).

As things stand, Iranian and American representatives are periodically meeting in Islamabad to negotiate a deal. The US and Israel have halted the bombing campaign and Iran appears to be allowing some vessels to pass through the straits but also, flexing its muscles, periodically closing them. News reports suggest that the Americans have given up their demand that Iran end its production of ballistic missiles but remain adamant that Iran hand over the 450 kilograms of 60% enriched Uranium probably buried in the tunnels around Isfahan and Natanz. This material could easily and quickly be enriched to the 90% needed for the production of nuclear weapons. In addition, Iran has hundreds of additional kilograms of Uranium enriched to 20% or less and the US is demanding that these too be removed from Iran. Lastly, the American negotiators demand that Iran agree in principle to halt its nuclear weapons project. It is not clear to what extent, if any, Iran will agree to these demands – demands at the core of the Israeli-American campaign against Iran.

But Iran has already been successful in another area. Both Israel and the US have in the past demanded that Tehran also cease backing and financing its terrorist proxies around the Middle East. Iran has never come close to agreeing to this and, in the current ceasefire negotiations, demanded that the deal include a cessation of Israel’s war-making against Hezbollah. After some wavering Trump apparently agreed and ordered Netanyahu to cease fire. On 16 April Trump announced an Israeli-Hezbollah ceasefire and the guns and rockets fell silent along the Israel-Lebanon border.

Weeks earlier, on 2 March, three days after the start of the Israeli-American assault on Iran, Hezbollah renewed its war against Israel, briefly rocketing northern Israel. The salvo may have been designed as a symbolic gesture, to appease their Iranian patrons. But the IDF had long prepared a renewal of the effort to crush the Hezbollah, and responded by a massive pounding of Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and in the Dahiya neighborhood of Beirut, Hezbollah’s main stronghold. Within days, the IDF also launched elements of five armored divisions into southern Lebanon to clear the area of Hezbollah fighters and arms depots. Israel ordered the tens of thousands of Shi’ite inhabitants of southern Lebanon and the Dahiya to evacuate an trek northwards. At the same time, the Hezbollah continuously rocketed northern Israel, paralyzing the region and sending tens of thousands of Israelis rushing to shelters while several thousand relocated southwards.

By the start of the ceasefire, Israel had ordered almost all of the inhabitants of the area south of Lebanon’s Zaharani River to move northward. So far, some 1.5 million Lebanese, from the south and Beirut, have been uprooted and now live in makeshift camps, public buildings and on the streets of Lebanon’s main towns. With the IDF now occupying a ten-kilometer deep strip of territory north of the international frontier, it is unclear how many of these Lebanese will be permitted to return to their homes – or what Israel intends to do regarding the displaced inhabitants from the villages north of the “Security Zone.” No doubt, the Hezbollah will try to include among those now making their way southward many armed operatives.

Israel and Lebanon have started negotiations and Trump has suggested that the countries’ leaders will meet in the coming weeks in Washington. The Lebanese government, led by President Joseph Aoun, detests (and fears) the Hezbollah and wants it disarmed but fears that any attempt by its army (which includes many Shi’ites) to disarm the organization will end in civil war – and the memory of the Muslim-Christian civil war that wracked Lebanon during 1975-1991 is still fresh in the minds of many Lebanese. Hezbollah has announced that it will resist disarmament and opposes direct Israeli-Lebanese negotiations, especially if geared to reaching eventual peace between the two countries. But so long as Hezbollah refuses to disarm Israel will leave its troops in occupation of the “Security Zone” it has established north of the border. Indeed, it is reported that the IDF is now busy setting up permanent fortified positions along the northern edge of the zone.

So what do the three ceasefires – in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran – portend? Long-term, it would appear, nothing good. So long as Hamas remains in control of Gaza’s two million Palestinian inhabitants and their encampments and remains an armed organization dedicated to Israel’s destruction, Israel will continue to control the half of the Strip it presently occupies and the passage of goods and people to and from the Hamas-controlled areas. The outbreak of hostilities between the two sides, as and when Hamas re-arms and feels confident, is almost inevitable. Similarly, unless Israel and the Lebanese government agree on peace and Hezbollah disarms, and the IDF withdraws from the area of Lebanon it now occupies, hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel are likely inevitable. Hezbollah wants the return to the south of its Shi’ite constituency and to resume its presence close to the Israeli border and it will eventually attack the IDF occupation forces, pinprick after pinprick, rocket after rocket - and Israel will retaliate by attacking Hezbollah personnel and bases to the north while the hundreds of thousands of Shi’ite evictees from the south will continue to languish in Lebanon’s public spaces and buildings, far from their homes.

Lastly, there is Iran. Here, much will depend on the details of a final US-Iranian agreement if it is ever reached. Trump will do his utmost not to renew the war. Iran and the US are still talking and it appears that Iran will benefit from reduced or fast-ending economic sanctions. Unfortunately, this will ensure the ayatollahs’ grip on power for the foreseeable future, with the unpopular regime secured against renewed mass protests by an impoverished populace. Presumably, the Iranian-US blockades of the Gulf ports and Hormuz will cancel out each other and bring about an agreement for the reopening of the strait to all comers though likely the Iranian will insist on Iranian “sovereignty” over the waterway, in the past a recognized international maritime passage.

But the continued Iranian desire to destroy Israel and to retain enriched Uranium and an enrichment program will, long-term, result in further Israeli military assaults, like those of June 2025 and February-March 2026, to inhibit Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, with or without US participation (and likely such participation will not be forthcoming given American domestic opposition to Trump, on many counts, and particularly to a renewal of his war against Iran). Trump’s successor will likely be even less amenable to renew the confrontation with Iran.

Hopefully, the corrupt, manipulative, internally divisive and inept Netanyahu will be voted out of office in the Israeli elections scheduled for late October (if he doesn’t prevent them from taking place). But Israel will continue to face a host of surrounding, armed Islamist organizations and a vengeful regime in Iran that seeks its blood. Israel and the Middle East face a bleak future.