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MEET YOUR AUTONOMOUS PRODUCT SECURITY ENGINEER
Merge Rate
76%
Backlogs Cleared
5,200+
Triage and fix today's backlog at machine speed. Catch risk at design time before new vulnerabilities get written.
See How it Works
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vulnerability backlogs
100k+
Enterprises can't clear what they already have. AI generates more.
time to exploit
<24
hours
The window between discovery and weaponization has collapsed. Manual response can't keep pace.
Pixee VulnOps cuts scanner noise down to real, exploitable risk and ships fixes your developers merge. Foresight catches risk in designs before code is generated.
Catches risk at design time, before generation
Turns fix authors into fix reviewers
Eliminates 98% of false positives
Get Started
"Use parameterized query here."
const query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1";
"Use your existing SafeQueryBuilder class."
SafeQueryBuilder.build(query)
.withParams(params)
.execute();
76%
Merge Rate
98%
Noise Reduction
Minutes
Resolution Time
01
Understand Your Real Attack Surface
Pixee reads your codebase, security policies, and architecture. It knows what runs, what's reachable, and what's exposed.
Design threat modeling
Deep codebase analysis
Architecture mapping
Execution path tracing
Outcome
02
Identify What Is Actually Vulnerable
Most findings are noise. Pixee traces real execution paths to prove exploitability — removing up to 98% of false positives before fixing anything.
Exploitability analysis
False positive elimination
Evidence-based triage
Personalized risk scores
Outcome
Remote Code Execution
Dead Code Path
Hardcoded Credentials
Mock Code
Path Traversal
Context-insensitive taint tracking
CVE-2021-23337
Build tooling only
Unpatched container
Stale asset inventory
Internet exposed asset contains HIGH sev findings
Incorrect risk scoring
Log4Shell CVE-2021-44228
Vulnerable function not called
SQL Injection in pgx Driver
Click to learn more!
Critical
Immediate Action Required
CVE-2024-27304 — SQL Injection in pgx PostgreSQL Driver
Context Identified
Verified Exploitable
Risk Prioritized
Remediation PR Created
SLA breach: 8 critical findings
Misattributed ownership
Unpatched container
Stale asset inventory
Missing CSRF Token
Framework protections ignored
CVE-2021-23337
Build tooling only
Remote Code Execution
Dead Code Path
Path Traversal
Context-insensitive taint tracking
Remote Code Execution
Dead Code Path
Hardcoded Credentials
Mock Code
03
Generate Fixes Developers Accept
Every remediation matches your conventions, respects your security rules, and passes CI before opening a PR.
Convention-aware fixes
Ready-to-merge PRs
Security embedded into designs
Team-style code generation
Outcome
Complexity
@router.post("/api/v1/webhooks/test")async def test_webhook( req: WebhookTestRequest, user: User = Depends(get_current_user), policy: OrgPolicy = Depends(get_org_policy), http: SafeHttpClient = Depends(),): parsed = urlparse(str(req.url)) # Fix #1 (SEC-POL-007): enforce HTTPS only if parsed.scheme != "https": raise ValidationError("Only HTTPS supported") # Fix #2 (CONTEXT): honor sec allowlist/kill-switch if not policy.egress_enabled or parsed.hostname not in policy.allowlisted_domains: raise ValidationError("Org policy blocks this destination") resolved_ip = await http.safe_resolve(parsed.hostname) # Fix #3 (COMPLEX): DNS pinning + private-range check if ip_address(resolved_ip).is_private orresolved_ip in INFRA_BLOCKLIST:
logger.warning("SSRF blocked", extra={"user_id": user.id, "host": parsed.hostname}) raise ValidationError("Unable to reach URL") resp = await http.get( str(req.url), resolved_ip=resolved_ip, # IP pinning preserves Host header for SNI
timeout=settings.EXTERNAL_CALL_TIMEOUT, # ADR-0041
follow_redirects=False,# redirect chain could bypass checks
) # CONVENTION: stable response contract return {"status": resp.status_code,"latency_ms": resp.elapsed_ms}
04
Every Decision Sharpens the Next
Every fix, triage call, and design review shares one context graph. Reactive work sharpens the next design review; design decisions sharpen the next fix. Your bespoke context compounds.
Your coding conventions
Ingest your policy
Provide feedback in natural language
Human driven reinforcement learning
Outcome
This change refactors SQL statements to be parameterized, rather than built by hand.
Without parameterization, developers must remember to escape string inputs using the rules for that database. It's usually buggy, at the least -- and sometimes vulnerable.
-
Statement stmt = connection.createStatement();
-
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name= '" + user + "'");
+
PreparedStatement stmt = connection.prepareStatement("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = ?");
+
stmt.setString(1, user);
+
ResultSet rs = stmt.executeQuery();
This change adds HTML sanitization to user-facing output to prevent stored XSS.
Without output encoding, data stored in the database can execute arbitrary scripts in victims' browsers when rendering search results -- a textbook stored XSS vector.
-
const dataString = JSON.stringify(products)
-
products[i].name = req.__(products[i].name)
+
import * as sanitizeHtml from 'sanitize-html'
+
products[i].name = sanitizeHtml(req.__(products[i].name))
+
products[i].description = sanitizeHtml(req.__(products[i].description))
This change validates file paths to prevent directory traversal attacks.
Without path validation, user-supplied file arguments can escape the working directory to read or write arbitrary files on the system -- a common supply-chain attack vector in CLI tools.
-
for (const file of files) {
-
// no path validation before fs operations
+
const resolvedPath = path.resolve(file);
+
if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(cwd + path.sep))
+
throw new Error('Invalid file path');
[SQL Injection in auth.ts] [XSS in profile.tsx] [Hardcoded Secret] [Insecure Randomness] [SQL Injection in auth.ts] [XSS in profile.tsx] [Hardcoded Secret] [Insecure Randomness] [SQL Injection in auth.ts] [XSS in profile.tsx] [Hardcoded Secret] [Insecure Randomness]
[Log4j Critical CVE-2021-44228] [Lodash Prototype Pollution] [Outdated React Version] [Express ReDoS] [Log4j Critical CVE-2021-44228] [Lodash Prototype Pollution] [Outdated React Version] [Express ReDoS] [Log4j Critical CVE-2021-44228] [Lodash Prototype Pollution] [Outdated React Version] [Express ReDoS]
[Publicly Accessible S3 Bucket] [Shadow API Endpoint Detected] [PII Data Exposure] [Unencrypted Traffic] [Publicly Accessible S3 Bucket] [Shadow API Endpoint Detected] [PII Data Exposure] [Unencrypted Traffic] [Publicly Accessible S3 Bucket] [Shadow API Endpoint Detected] [PII Data Exposure] [Unencrypted Traffic]
[SEC-1029: Fix Critical Vuln] [SEC-1030: Dependency Review] [SEC-1031: Patch Management] [SEC-1032: Audit] [SEC-1029: Fix Critical Vuln] [SEC-1030: Dependency Review] [SEC-1031: Patch Management] [SEC-1032: Audit] [SEC-1029: Fix Critical Vuln] [SEC-1030: Dependency Review] [SEC-1031: Patch Management] [SEC-1032: Audit]
Pixee's Context Graph
The "Why It Happened" Layer
Your context graph is built from your data and institutional knowledge.
Every design review, triage, and fix feeds back in.
The platform compounds with every run.
Queryable history
replayable decisions
auditable proof
How Pixee builds your organization's security memory
Security policies, architectural patterns, governance rules.
The "what should happen" layer.
Code, scanner findings, dependencies, configurations.
The "what exists" layer.
Exploit verification, reachability analysis, cross-scanner correlation.
The "what is exploitable" layer.
Merge/reject patterns, organizational preferences, precedents.
The "what you trust" layer.
"Machine-speed triage and remediation solves today's backlog. Design-time security prevents tomorrow's. Both need to share the same context, so every decision at one end makes the other end smarter."
Attackers don't wait for top-100 lists. Dashboards don't reduce risk.
Merged pull requests do.
See How it Works
Get a Demo
What you get
Triage that filters 100% of noise
Fixes that match your code
Risk caught at design
76% developer merge rate
Every decision logged and provable
Resolution That Lasts