@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ In the present lecture, a single good is allocated to one person within a set of
2323Here we'll learn about and simulate two classic auctions :
24242525* a First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (FPSB)
26-* a Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (SPSB) created by William Vickery {cite}`Vickrey_61`
26+* a Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auction (SPSB) created by William Vickrey {cite}`Vickrey_61`
27272828We'll also learn about and apply a
2929@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ $$ (eq:optbid2)
112112113113114114115-A proof for this assertion is available at the [Wikepedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction) about Vickery auctions
115+A proof for this assertion is available at the [Wikepedia page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction) about Vickrey auctions
116116117117+++
118118@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ In a SPSB auction bidders optimally choose to bid their values.
129129Formally, a dominant strategy profile in a SPSB auction with a single, indivisible item has each bidder bidding its value.
130130131131A proof is provided at [the Wikepedia
132- page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction) about Vicker auctions
132+ page](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction) about Vickrey auctions
133133134134+++
135135