Weakness ID: 290
Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED This CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilitiesAbstraction: Base Base - a weakness that is still mostly independent of a resource or technology, but with sufficient details to provide specific methods for detection and prevention. Base level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 2 or 3 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
Description
This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.
Common Consequences
This table specifies different individual consequences
associated with the weakness. The Scope identifies the application security area that is
violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an
adversary succeeds in exploiting this weakness. The Likelihood provides information about
how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other
consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a weakness will be
exploited to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to
achieve a different impact.
| Impact | Details |
|---|---|
|
Bypass Protection Mechanism; Gain Privileges or Assume Identity |
Scope: Access Control
This weakness can allow an attacker to access resources which are not otherwise accessible without proper authentication. |
Relationships
This table shows the weaknesses and high level categories that are related to this
weakness. These relationships are defined as ChildOf, ParentOf, MemberOf and give insight to
similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition,
relationships such as PeerOf and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar weaknesses that the user
may want to explore.
Relevant to the view "Research Concepts" (View-1000)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf |
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
|
1390 | Weak Authentication |
| ParentOf |
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
|
291 | Reliance on IP Address for Authentication |
| ParentOf |
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
|
293 | Using Referer Field for Authentication |
| ParentOf |
Variant - a weakness that is linked to a certain type of product, typically involving a specific language or technology. More specific than a Base weakness. Variant level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 3 to 5 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, technology, language, and resource.
|
350 | Reliance on Reverse DNS Resolution for a Security-Critical Action |
| PeerOf |
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
|
602 | Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security |
Relevant to the view "Software Development" (View-699)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf |
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
|
1211 | Authentication Errors |
Relevant to the view "Weaknesses for Simplified Mapping of Published Vulnerabilities" (View-1003)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| ChildOf |
Class - a weakness that is described in a very abstract fashion, typically independent of any specific language or technology. More specific than a Pillar Weakness, but more general than a Base Weakness. Class level weaknesses typically describe issues in terms of 1 or 2 of the following dimensions: behavior, property, and resource.
|
287 | Improper Authentication |
Relevant to the view "Architectural Concepts" (View-1008)
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf |
Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic.
|
1010 | Authenticate Actors |
Modes
Of Introduction
The different Modes of Introduction provide information
about how and when this
weakness may be introduced. The Phase identifies a point in the life cycle at which
introduction
may occur, while the Note provides a typical scenario related to introduction during the
given
phase.
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Implementation | |
| Architecture and Design |
Applicable Platforms
This listing shows possible areas for which the given
weakness could appear. These
may be for specific named Languages, Operating Systems, Architectures, Paradigms,
Technologies,
or a class of such platforms. The platform is listed along with how frequently the given
weakness appears for that instance.
| Languages |
Class: Not Language-Specific (Undetermined Prevalence) |
Demonstrative Examples
Example 1
The following code authenticates users.
(bad code)
Example Language: Java
String sourceIP = request.getRemoteAddr();
if (sourceIP != null && sourceIP.equals(APPROVED_IP)) {
authenticated = true;
}
The authentication mechanism implemented relies on an IP address for source validation. If an attacker is able to spoof the IP, they may be able to bypass the authentication mechanism.
Example 2
Both of these examples check if a request is from a trusted address before responding to the request.
(bad code)
Example Language: C
sd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
serv.sin_family = AF_INET;
serv.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
servr.sin_port = htons(1008);
bind(sd, (struct sockaddr *) & serv, sizeof(serv));
while (1) {
memset(msg, 0x0, MAX_MSG);
clilen = sizeof(cli);
if (inet_ntoa(cli.sin_addr)==getTrustedAddress()) {
n = recvfrom(sd, msg, MAX_MSG, 0, (struct sockaddr *) & cli, &clilen);
}
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java
while(true) {
DatagramPacket rp=new DatagramPacket(rData,rData.length);
outSock.receive(rp);
String in = new String(p.getData(),0, rp.getLength());
InetAddress clientIPAddress = rp.getAddress();
int port = rp.getPort();
if (isTrustedAddress(clientIPAddress) & secretKey.equals(in)) {
out = secret.getBytes();
DatagramPacket sp =new DatagramPacket(out,out.length, IPAddress, port); outSock.send(sp);
}
}
The code only verifies the address as stored in the request packet. An attacker can spoof this address, thus impersonating a trusted client.
Example 3
The following code samples use a DNS lookup in order to decide whether or not an inbound request is from a trusted host. If an attacker can poison the DNS cache, they can gain trusted status.
(bad code)
Example Language: C
struct hostent *hp;struct in_addr myaddr;
char* tHost = "trustme.example.com";
myaddr.s_addr=inet_addr(ip_addr_string);
hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &myaddr, sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
if (hp && !strncmp(hp->h_name, tHost, sizeof(tHost))) {
trusted = true;
} else {
trusted = false;
}
(bad code)
Example Language: Java
String ip = request.getRemoteAddr();
InetAddress addr = InetAddress.getByName(ip);
if (addr.getCanonicalHostName().endsWith("trustme.com")) {
trusted = true;
}
(bad code)
Example Language: C#
IPAddress hostIPAddress = IPAddress.Parse(RemoteIpAddress);
IPHostEntry hostInfo = Dns.GetHostByAddress(hostIPAddress);
if (hostInfo.HostName.EndsWith("trustme.com")) {
trusted = true;
}
IP addresses are more reliable than DNS names, but they can also be spoofed. Attackers can easily forge the source IP address of the packets they send, but response packets will return to the forged IP address. To see the response packets, the attacker has to sniff the traffic between the victim machine and the forged IP address. In order to accomplish the required sniffing, attackers typically attempt to locate themselves on the same subnet as the victim machine. Attackers may be able to circumvent this requirement by using source routing, but source routing is disabled across much of the Internet today. In summary, IP address verification can be a useful part of an authentication scheme, but it should not be the single factor required for authentication.
Selected Observed
Examples
Note: this is a curated list of examples for users to understand the variety of ways in which this weakness can be introduced. It is not a complete list of all CVEs that are related to this CWE entry.
| Reference | Description |
|---|---|
|
S-bus functionality in a home automation product performs access control using an IP allowlist, which can be bypassed by a forged IP address. |
|
|
VOIP product allows authentication bypass using 127.0.0.1 in the Host header. |
Weakness Ordinalities
| Ordinality | Description |
|---|---|
|
Resultant |
(where the weakness is typically related to the presence of some other weaknesses) |
Memberships
This MemberOf Relationships table shows additional CWE Categories and Views that
reference this weakness as a member. This information is often useful in understanding where a
weakness fits within the context of external information sources.
| Nature | Type | ID | Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| MemberOf |  View - a subset of CWE entries that provides a way of examining CWE content. The two main view structures are Slices (flat lists) and Graphs (containing relationships between entries). |
884 | CWE Cross-section |
| MemberOf | Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. |
956 | SFP Secondary Cluster: Channel Attack |
| MemberOf | Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. |
1353 | OWASP Top Ten 2021 Category A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures |
| MemberOf | Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. |
1366 | ICS Communications: Frail Security in Protocols |
| MemberOf | Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. |
1396 | Comprehensive Categorization: Access Control |
| MemberOf | Category - a CWE entry that contains a set of other entries that share a common characteristic. |
1442 | OWASP Top Ten 2025 Category A07:2025 - Authentication Failures |
Vulnerability Mapping Notes
| Usage |
ALLOWED
(this CWE ID may be used to map to real-world vulnerabilities) |
| Reason | Acceptable-Use |
|
Rationale |
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities. |
|
Comments |
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction. |
Notes
Relationship
This can be resultant from insufficient verification.
Taxonomy
Mappings
| Mapped Taxonomy Name | Node ID | Fit | Mapped Node Name |
|---|---|---|---|
| PLOVER | Authentication bypass by spoofing |
References
| [REF-62] | Mark Dowd, John McDonald and Justin Schuh. "The Art of Software Security Assessment". Chapter 3, "Spoofing and Identification", Page 72. 1st Edition. Addison Wesley. 2006. |
Content
History
| Submissions |
||
|---|---|---|
| Submission Date | Submitter | Organization |
|
2006-07-19
(CWE Draft 3, 2006-07-19) |
PLOVER | |
 Modifications |
||
| Modification Date | Modifier | Organization |
|
2025-12-11
(CWE 4.19, 2025-12-11) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities | ||
|
2023-10-26
(CWE 4.13, 2023-10-26) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Observed_Examples | ||
|
2023-06-29
(CWE 4.12, 2023-06-29) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Mapping_Notes | ||
|
2023-04-27
(CWE 4.11, 2023-04-27) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction | ||
|
2023-01-31
(CWE 4.10, 2023-01-31) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description | ||
|
2022-10-13
(CWE 4.9, 2022-10-13) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
|
2021-10-28
(CWE 4.6, 2021-10-28) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
|
2021-07-20
(CWE 4.5, 2021-07-20) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | ||
|
2020-02-24
(CWE 4.0, 2020-02-24) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
|
2019-06-20
(CWE 3.3, 2019-06-20) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | ||
|
2017-11-08
(CWE 3.0, 2017-11-08) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Modes_of_Introduction, Relationships | ||
|
2017-05-03
(CWE 2.11, 2017-05-05) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
|
2014-07-30
(CWE 2.8, 2014-07-31) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships | ||
|
2014-02-18
(CWE 2.6, 2014-02-19) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Related_Attack_Patterns | ||
|
2013-07-17
(CWE 2.5, 2013-07-17) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationships | ||
|
2012-05-11
(CWE 2.2, 2012-05-15) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships | ||
|
2011-06-01
(CWE 1.13, 2011-06-01) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Common_Consequences | ||
|
2009-07-27
(CWE 1.5, 2009-07-27) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Relationship_Notes | ||
|
2008-09-08
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) |
CWE Content Team | MITRE |
| updated Description, Relationships, Relationship_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings | ||
|
2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) |
Sean Eidemiller | Cigital |
| added/updated demonstrative examples | ||
|
2008-07-01
(CWE 1.0, 2008-09-09) |
Eric Dalci | Cigital |
| updated Time_of_Introduction | ||