Recent content on ANTITREE
Sandboxes, Seccomp, and Syscalls Building Insecure and Incomplete Profiles Bypasses and Breakouts Measuring Scoring and Scaling with Seccompute I’ve been describing a common thread throughout these posts which is we can spend hours building artisinally crafted seccomp profiles and say that everything is more secure, but we don’t inherently know that. We just assume. And even when we…
Sandboxes, Seccomp, and Syscalls Building Insecure and Incomplete Profiles Bypasses and Breakouts Measuring Scoring and Scaling with Seccompute The other post, I’ve been mostly describing the operational burden of managing seccomp profiles and describing scenarios where the seccomp profile might not be as effective as we think. This is the post I wanted to get back attacker perspective. You…
Sandboxes, Seccomp, and Syscalls Building Insecure and Incomplete Profiles Bypasses and Breakouts Measuring Scoring and Scaling with Seccompute The idea behind seccomp profiles for a container is simple: your container makes good syscalls, let’s block the bad system calls. So you record the syscalls your container makes, build a seccomp JSON profile that allows only those syscalls, then…
Sandboxes, Seccomp, and Syscalls Building Insecure and Incomplete Profiles Bypasses and Breakouts Measuring Scoring and Scaling with Seccompute It’s been a few weeks since I presented at BSidesSF . A talk called “Sandboxes, Seccomp, and Syscalls: Chasing Isolation in Kubernetes”. Since then, I wanted to dump the details of the talk and some of the points I was trying to make. The…
Just leaving DEFCON and wanted to post my slide deck from the DEFCON Cloud Village. It’s a 20 minute talk so I focused on container registries with read access and write access. Here’s the deck: DEFCON Cloud Village go-pillage-registries The main take-away from the talk was based on a discussion at work about the whiteout files used by the overlay file system. Registry Pillage 2.0:…
Seccompare.com quickly compares two container seccomp profiles and includes a handy syscall lookup table. Are you interested in some practical guidance for applying custom seccomp profiles for a container? You aren’t?? Too bad. Here it comes. Check out https://www.seccompare.com Custom Seccomp Profile Auditor Here’s what it is: Let’s assume the role as the worlds greatest…
seccomp-diff extracts the real seccomp filters straight from a running container Reverse engineering BPF taught me more about containers and syscalls than I expected seccomp good, seccomp at scale hard Ever wonder if the seccomp profile Docker or Kubernetes thinks it’s applying is the same one actually enforcing syscalls inside your container? Sure, we all do, right? Well I wrote…
Take-aways Container registries are simple services ripe for subtle abuse They are trusted endpoints making them useful for exfil and post-exploitation It’s easy to make a malicious file appear like a legitimate image layer I’m beating up container environments in the context of supply chain threats over the last few months. If you’re working in the container or Kubernetes…
UPDATE 11/28/2020 : Thanks to @jaybeale and @sethsec for pointing out I was calling it “OPA Gateway” instead of OPA Gatekeeper. UPDATE 3/20/2021 : Tim Allclair and Jordan Liggitt have a proposal with a demo that shares what PSPs may look like in the future. 3-Tier Pod Security Proposal . It’s talking about turning the ideas of PSP’s into an admission controller that…
I’m writing about the Kubernetes API’s use of the “LIST” verb it controls access to Secrets in a cluster. I’ve seen way too may environments, tools, templates, and examples that are hoping that LIST verbs can provide a meaningful security control compared to the GET verb. I’m going through a simple demo below and a few one-liners that can help you audit this…
TL;DR The Linux Kernel keyring is known to be a security issue for containers Download my tool for breaking out of a container to steal all the host keys here: keyctl-unmask We can use this in Kubernetes to steal all node keys as well Have you ever wanted to steal all the secrets from a Linux host from within a container? Sure we all have. Lets do it at scale and share a tool that speeds this up…
Saturday, I gave my talk titled “Command and KubeCTL: Real-World Kubernetes Security for Pentesters” at Shmoocon 2020. I’m following up with this post that goes into more details than I could cover in 50 minutes. Here’s the important stuff: Link to Slides Link to Demos @ me on Twitter Premise This talk was designed to be a Kubernetes security talk for people doing offensive…
It’s been on my list for at least 6 months to start contributing to krew if possible. My first plugin is called net-forward and it’s very simple but confusing if you don’t see what I’m using it for. Kubectl net-forward From a user level, net-forward helps you create a forwarding proxy from your machine to an arbitrary IP and port that’s accessible in the cluster. For…
Sometimes during a container or Kubernetes assessment, we get requested to review whether a runtime security tool that a client uses is sufficient for their threat model. This often means reviewing a custom seccomp-bpf profile, AppArmor config, or third party tool that tries to enforce the isolation between a container and the host. There’s two approaches we usually take during these gigs:…
By default Docker allows all of their containers to run with the CAP_NET_RAW capability , I believe to easily support ICMP health checks when needed. Supporting ping makes sense but this post will go through why CAP_NET_RAW is an unnecessary risk and how you can still send pings without needing CAP_NET_RAW. What does CAP_NET_RAW do? CAP_NET_RAW controls a processes ability to build any types of…
After 8 years of Security B-Sides Rochester , it’s time for me to turn it over to new leadership that wants to keep the conference going. It’s exciting that people still want to. My role as of recent has been the person that invested the most time doing the running around to organize the conference but that’s not to say I “run” the conference – it truly is run…
The folks at Rochester 2600 were regaled by a talk from Payap Sirinam who is on Matthew Wright’s academic team at RIT. They’re working on an interesting system that aims to defend against website fingerprinting attacks – a major threat to anonymity systems like tor. As in, if you’re using tor, passive adversaries in position to watch traffic between the tor client and a…
One of my favorite things about the Tor Project is their proposal system . Every idea that’s worth thinking about goes into a proposal template that talks about the idea, the technical background, why it’s proposed, as well as any risks or design issues that need to be factored in. They read like RFC’s and that will either make you kind of excited or kind of sleepy. But in any…
I noticed this bug ticket from Tor Project last week: Make exit flag depend on ports 80 and 443, not 6667 and it reminded me about a short talk I gave regarding how the port you connect to a service on, directly affects the anonymity you’re able to achieve. In short, visiting services on non-standard ports such as https://www.antitree.com:64201 increases the risk of you choosing a…
Tor Project has just released version 0.3.2.1-Alpha of tor that supports the long-awaited, next-generation onion services that aim to repair many its known flaws. Here’s what I understand are the big changes and features compared to the old version. Key Size Current Onion services right now are based on RSA 1024 bit keys which, for long-term keys, aren’t an ideal size. While RSA 1024…
This is a follow up from the Custom Seccomp profile post which went through some of the background information. Speed up custom seccomp profile generation with Syscall2seccomp You can always manually track down the syscalls that your application makes, and build a custom seccomp profile for your Docker container, but I’ve created the tool syscall2seccomp that helps speed the profile building…
This post goes through building custom Docker seccomp profiles for your container. I’m not recommending you do this especially in enterprise environments, but I’m being charitable to the idea that system call filtering is the basis of a lot of sandboxing technologies and filtering out unnecessary ones should reduce the attack footprint of your application. This is more of an…
This post goes into what tor’s onion service authentication features do, how they work, and when they should be used based on your threat model because I couldn’t find any other documentation about it besides reading the spec. “Stealth” only provides “stealthy” properties against malicious HSDirs and basic has some additional obfuscation measures that might make…
One of Docker’s many updates this year was adding seccomp support. In short, seccomp/secomp-bpf is a way of filtering the system calls that you want to allow an application to make. It’s used for sandboxing enforcement it a lot of projects including Chromium , bubblewrap , and SubgraphOS . In Docker, it’s enabled by default (in supported environments) and has a default profile…
I’ve written about [customizing PhantomJS to defend against fingerprinting]({{ ref “post/2015-05-18-browser-fingerprinting-attack-and-defense-with-phantomjs2015/05/18/browser-fingerprinting-attack-and-defense-with-phantomjs/” >}}) but I never really looked at what affect Selenium (the driver that control lots of different Browsers) has on the fingerprintability of say something…
Continuation from previous posts: 1 and 2 Website Fingerprinting Defenses at the Application Layer I like research projects on subjects that I feel have no hope. So here’s hoping for hope! This research is attempting to specifically defend onion services from being fingerprinted. The most common attack scenario is when an adversary is able to inspect the traffic between the tor client and…
Continuation from previous post: 1 Waterfilling: Balancing The Tor Network With Maximum Diversity This paper is proposing a new tor circuit path selection algorithm that makes bigger nodes run middle/relay traffic more often and smaller nodes more become exits exits. Apparently the talk included an abridged history of tor’s path selection: 2003: Uniform at random 2004: Introduce bandwidth…
The annual Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS) 2017 is a privacy nerd’s dream and has always been on my list to attend. Unfortunately, I did not make it out to Minnesota to attend but all the papers are readily available online so yay, open access! These are my notes about some interesting research presented this year based on the papers that were released and the live tweets…
Summary This blog post is going to show you how to go from exploiting a single container to gaining root on an entire cluster and all nodes. This is caused by a default flaw in the way Kubernetes manages containers. I’m doing a lot more container work at my day job – looking for container breakouts, container infastructure review, and orchestration technologies. I’ve been…
If you’re like me and want to stand up a quick server that can response on all ports, here’s a quick way to do it. You’ll need a ton of memory to pull this off so setup your machine or VM accordingly. This works for nginx but you’ll have to go through some of the same steps for other services. Linux Ulimits Check current ulimits, hard limits, and soft limits on your current…
UPDATE: The source repository for all this code is hosted here: https://github.com/antitree/bsidesroc2017ctf Check out the previous 1 , 2 , 3 and 4 for the other CTF challenges. Rebound Attack I admit this this was the most complex one which is why it was worth 500. The idea is I want you to exploit yourself in very specific ways. This is adapting a research project from years ago where I…
Check out the previous 1 , 2 , and 3 for the other CTF challenges. Hop Till You Drop The original plan for this one was to show how you can setup an exit node to allow single hop circuits – in other words, you don’t create a full 3 hop circuit on tor but just use the exit node as the one and only proxy. This is normally banned unless you allow it both at the exit and on the client.
This is a continuation of the previous posts talking about BSidesROC onion related CTF challenges. Port of Onion (PoO) I don’t think anyone got this one mostly because I think they were expecting that it was going to take too long. Here’s the clue: Sail with me on a 3 hour cruise A storm hits us hard but we must not lose Take any port in a storm Just to get some place warm There's only…
This is a continuation of the previous post talking about BSidesROC onion related CTF challenges. Double Ontonion One team figured this one out. The point of this challenge is to exemplify a common problem with onion services. Basically, if you don’t configure the web server correctly, there are cases where an onion service might leak additional information about the host. For example, if…
Now that BSidesROC is over and the CTF is closed, I can share some of the details about the Onions CTF category that I made. I think the feedback was that a lot of the challenges were too hard or they were straight-forward but they took too long to do. Setup Each of the services in the Onions category contained a vanity BSidesROC onion address. This was thanks to my friend who threw some GPU…
Our little hacker conference that usually draws about 400 people is happening again on 4-21 and 4-22. If you want the song and dance about all the things we have planned, you can check out the website . I want to cover all the internal changes. Volunteers We’re getting old. What can I tell you. The longer you run something like BSidesROC (and Interlock and 2600 for that matter) the more…
I’ve made a scalable way of building a fully private functioning tor network using Docker. Why give any back story, if it’s useful to you, then here you go: Source: https://github.com/antitree/private-tor-network Docker Hub: https://hub.docker.com/r/antitree/private-tor/ Setup All you really need to do is clone the git repo, build the image (or download from Docker Hub) and then spin up a network…
It’s another year of BSidesROC , a local hacker con that we put together. Our sixth year actually. Not everyone really cares about how BSidesROC has changed over the years but it’s hard not to at least mention them for posterity and laugh at our failures. I think that BSidesROC has evolved with the times or at least updated their memes. Year one was all about the memes and just messing around and…
This post on hackernews got my attention. It’s a IoT based visualization showing your activities and health metrics. It’s very flashy and interesting looking, like you’re going to see it in an episode of CSI Cyber. The term “actionable” I’ve usually applied to government types discussing the latest threat intel but we can also take it to apply with our visualizations. Actionable visualizations,…
I don’t remember the exact conversation, but Jason Ross inspired me to buy DRWND.com, as in Drone + PWND = DRWND. I’ve owned it for a bit waiting for some specific data so that I could use it as an informational site about DRWN attacks. As IANA web developer, this has been interesting and terrible but simple enough to share. www.drwnd.com I won t assume the site makes any sense right now so I can…
PhantomJS is a headless browser that when you use Selenium, turns into a powerful, scriptable tool for scraping or automated web testing in even JavaScript heavy applications. We’ve known that browsers are being fingerprinted and used for identifying individual visits on a website for a long time. This technology is a common feature of your web analytics tools. They want to know as much as…
I’ve updated the Raspberry Bridge build to 1.5.1Beta to update a few things and address a couple issues. The main changes are: updated Tor to latest stable release updated obfsproxy updated OS including some security patches Download Torrent: http://rbb.antitree.com/torrents/RBBlatest.torrent More info: http://rbb.antitree.com/
The Meek Protocol has recently been getting a lot of attention since the Tor project made a few blog posts about it. Meek is a censorship evasion protocol that users a tactic called “domain fronting” to evade DPI-based censorship tactics. The idea is that using a CDN such as Google, Akamai, or Cloudflare, you can proxy connections (using the TLS SNI extension) so that if an adversary wanted to…
Over at rbb.antitree.com , you’ll see the details of a new project of mine: To build a Raspberry Pi environment to make it easy for anyone to run a Tor Bridge node. The goal here has been to release an RBP image that is minimalist (in terms of storage consumption as well as resource consumption) and provides the necessary tools to run and maintain a Tor Bridge Node on a Raspberry Pi.
If you’re like me, you’re probably getting inundated with posts about how the latest revelations show that NSA specifically tracks Tor users and the privacy conscious . I wanted to provide some perspective of how XKeyscore fits into an overall surveillance system before jumping out of our collective pants. As I’ve written about before , the Intelligence Lifecycle (something that the NSA and other…
Chutney is a tool designed to let you build your own private Tor network instance in minutes. It does so by using configuration templates of directory authorities, bridges, relays, clients, and a variety of combinations in between. It comes with a few examples to get you started. Executing this command, for example ./chutney configure networks/basic will build a ten client network made up of three…
BSidesROC is over. I thought it might be interesting to give a behind-the-scenes look at some of the stuff that makes BSidesROC run. OPs We have “Ops”. A few years ago we decided to try to organize BSides like an IRC network where each channel has an Op and an Op controls what happens in that channel. So for us Ops are trusted volunteers, and the channels are facets of BSidesROC such as the…
Rochester’s version of a Security B-Sides is coming up next week . There’s a rush to finalize everything and there might be a question about this new event I’ve referenced as “Privacy Workshop”, “OPSEC Training”, or just AntiTree talks for 3 hours. The Privacy Workshop Track is something that came out of an ad-hoc event that @ CJP has been doing for the last couple of BSidesROC’s. He would walk in…
Last year, I was bit by the idea of intel as a research project. I presented at BSidesDetroit on the topic of corporate espionage and the contrast between HUMINT and TECHINT. My Defcon Skytalk was titled “Bringin Intelligence Back To The Hacker Community” and I did a GRRConCon talk on the capabilities and structure of a normal private intelligence campaign. The research had a side-affect of…
For a few years now, I’ve been stating my plans for the rest of the year, and reviewing how the previous year went. Here’s the review: Last Year Major Con Presentation One of my goals was to be accepted into a “Major Con” for some definition of that word. This year I presented at Derbycon, GRRCon, Defcon Skytalks, BSides Detroit, and the Rochester Security Summit. I will say that my moon shot was…