Humanism & Veganism

You’ll often encounter a certain bewilderment among vegans: Why does the struggle against animal oppression resonate so much less than struggles against interpersonal oppression? While anti-racism and feminism are widely recognized even into the political center, veganism is often met with indifference or defensive rejection. The answer to this riddle lies in the social function of morality.

To understand why movements for the liberation of human subjects are more successful than those for animal liberation, one must leave idealism behind. Marxism, for instance, is not a moral project but an analysis of power relations. When Marx calls upon the proletariat to unite, he does not appeal to its morality, but to its strategic self-interest. Only together can the working class improve its position.

Peter Kropotkin argued similarly in his work Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution. He interpreted cooperation not as an expression of a transcendent “correct” mode of conduct, but as a result of natural selection. Groups that cooperate reproduce more effectively. Accordingly, morality isn’t just handed down from the heavens; it is an expression of material interests and a tool for alliance-building. It serves to sacrifice unstable short-term advantages in favor of long-term collective strength and to stabilize alliances through social norms.

Normative humanism—the idea that all humans deserve equal rights—is the product of social natural selection. It is successful because it offers a tangible benefit: those who show solidarity can expect that solidarity to be reciprocated. A win-win situation arises within the set of those who can understand each other and forge alliances—i.e., humanity.

Here lies the critical difference to veganism. The relationship between humans and other animals follows a completely different incentive structure. An animal can neither understand ethical stances nor reciprocate them. There is no material payoff, no strategic alliance, and no mutual empowerment. It is simply not in the material interest of the individual to adhere to an ethic that “pleases” animals, as animals are not political subjects who could function as allies.

At this point, the notion of “the human” itself must be questioned. A consistent materialism is methodologically antihumanist: it rejects the idea of a metaphysical human exceptionalism in favor of an analysis of biological and social structures. From this perspective, normative humanism does not appear as a transhistorical truth, but as the ideological product of a (currently existing) congruence: it is the intersubjective universalism that happens to extend exactly as far as the human species. Should other beings—such as extraterrestrials or androids—turn out to be capable of forging alliances with humans, this circle would expand. Humanism, in that case, would take on a reactionary, divisive role.

The structural problems of capitalism—specifically overproduction and the growth drive—contribute far more to animal suffering than individual consumption choices ever could. Nevertheless, veganism often insists on problematizing the latter. As I demonstrated in my article Against Moralism, this focus on individual guilt usually provokes defensive distancing and fragments the potential alliances necessary to overcome capitalism.

Appeals for self-sacrifice paint a false picture of leftist politics. Real change does not arise through living “the right life in the the wrong,” but through the pooling of power to win better living conditions. Only when the logic of valorization is materially overcome does the space for genuinely combating suffering arise. Those who wish to help animals optimally should therefore refrain from an overzealous propagation of this goal.

The highest virtue is as if it is no virtue.
All-embracing virtue is as if it is lacking virtue.
Rigorous virtue is as if it is indolent loafing.
Real essence is as if it is empty.

– Laozi, Daodejing chapter 41