Recently on engagements I started experiencing two reoccurring patterns, the first being that certipy and certify would both show me that a endpoint is not vulnerable to the ESC8 attack even though it is. The same was in telling me that the endpoint is vulnerable during my retests even though I knew it was not! Secondly that clients even after following Microsoft’s advice in turning EPA on,…
AWS Pentesting Cheatsheet This cheatsheet was written after a long winded engagement in which I took all my personal notes, some notes from the internet and fed them into AI to make sense of all the things I had compiled over a month and a half It could be the most comprehensive cheatsheet on the internet for AWS pentesting or it might not be! Use your own judgement and determine what fits and…
Having improved/built on impacket internally at my work place, I wanted to take the next step in contributing to the library by way of new modules. I ended up landing on two: MS-NEGOEX, which remains a work in progress(updates soon) and the focus of this blog, MS-RAA. MS-RAA turned out to be a great first protocol to implement since the spececification is short(less than 50 pages), most of it maps…
This cheatsheet hopes to serve as a practical, copy-paste field reference for Titanis , which is a library made by TrustedSec and is cross-platform C# / .NET 8 protocol library and toolset for Windows / Active Directory. Why Titanis? Titanis is stealthier than Impacket in many ways. Enough that it requires its own deep dive and research. I will be releasing a blog post that dives into the exact…
The Problem If you are like me, you have found yourself digging through Microsoft specifications and RFC documentation trying to wrangle with a new exploit or tooling to get DA faster than your peers. The biggest problem one may encounter is the specifications are meant for developers; they will tell you the song and dance in its entirety, but it never goes beyond in any way that may be useful for…
The recent leak as well as it being brought to my attention by Ian from Packetlabs, made me super interested in the malware Ive been hearing so much about. The internet is always lit ablaze whenever these happen so it was pretty exciting to get the chance at getting hands on with the sample. Published openly by a group calling themselves TeamPCP, the repository last/most recent commit message…
Repository Used: https://github.com/PedroTortoriello/Shai-Hulud-Open-Source Last known commit: da10861 — "Shai-Hulud: A Gift From TeamPCP" The analysis of the repository shared by TeamPCP was mainly done statically as well as some other elements from here confirmed dynamically using a VM hosted on a VPS I own. Goes without saying but don’t try doing this yourself unless you know what you are…
A few months ago I started what I thought was fairly straight forward piece of work: rewrite/fork Impacket internally for use at my current company. What I didn’t expect was that the project would end up dragging me into the deep end of Kerberos, NTLM, SPNEGO, SMB2/3, DCE/RPC and DCOM in a way that has changed the way I view offensive tooling, my mindset as an operator and finally my…
Introduction: The Day My Toolbox Failed Me Picture this: You’re deep into an engagement, credentials in hand, ready to unleash your best, brightest ideas And then… nothing. Almost every single one of your tool throw the same error: {'desc': 'StrongerAuthRequired', 'result': 8, 'message': '...'} Welcome to my recent engagement, where I learned that modern AD hardening doesn’t…
I was doing an internal engagement some time ago for a client and noticed that the CA was configured for constrained delegation with a system that looked like a Web Server. I first noticed this using nxc’s --find-delegation switch present in the LDAP module, but also confirmed it with BloodHound as follows: A side note: if you want to make the delegation check using the AD PowerShell module…
During a recent penetration test I did against a critical infrastructure operator, I had achieved Domain Administrator through two independent routes; ADCS ESC4, and by combining an LMCompatibility value of 2 with LDAP signing disabled. With that out of the way, I had time to shift focus away from the AD and identity side of the organization and focus my attention to their edge devices, of which…
Quick Intro As an electrical engineer with a passion for electronics, I have recently been reverse engineering and researching commonly deployed edge and IoT devices found in critical use environments. This research focuses on the Mozart FM Transmitter (web management interface version WEBMOZZI-00287), manufactured by DB Broadcast. I have discovered about 14 CVEs and likely more exist in the…
While the core concepts aren’t new, I believe the use of ADCS for domain computer takeover through Virtual Account abuse is previously undocumented/unexplored route to achieving your goals. I would like to start off by giving credit to my coworker, Michael( https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-mcin/ ) for exploring today’s abuse paths but also for setting up a home environment to…
We all know the classic RID 500 administrator account, the one who’s able to use NTLM authentication even with “Protected user” membership and is your go to during delegation attacks but there’s a kink in this lateral movement free for all; The Domain Controller doesn’t actually work the that way. The Domain Controller functions differently to other computers in that…